

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XXVI. No. 1.

JANUARY, 1934

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

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BEFORE these pages are in print, the Government will have announced the main provisions of a measure which is due for enactment early this year, and which must bring about a development of the Public Assistance service of the greatest interest and importance. I write without knowledge of what is to be proposed. I shall try, therefore, only to indicate the nature of the problem which has to be faced, the main considerations which seem to arise, and the alternative solutions which are possible.

1. Public Assistance is the new name for what until recently was called the Poor Law. But as always in these matters, the change of name imports a change of conception and of policy. The history of the Poor Law is well known.¹ Its first formulation was the famous Elizabethan statute of 1601: its principal landmarks the Acts of 1722, 1834, the Royal Commission of 1905-9, the legislation and orders based thereon, and the Local Government Act of 1929. The purpose of the Poor Law has always been "the relief of destitution." Its service has been available, on proof of need, for any member of the community, on different conditions, at different times, and in different circumstances, but still as "the final resort for all whose needs have not been met by other means."²

¹ Convenient summaries are given in the Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law of 1909, and on "Unemployment Insurance," 1932.

² *Minutes of Evidence, Ministry of Health, Royal Commission 1932*, vol. i, p. 269.

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In most of its relations, particularly during the last twenty years, great changes have taken place in the Poor Law service. In general, the direction of these changes is well enough represented by the phrase "the break-up of the Poor Law," so powerfully recommended by the Minority of the 1905 Commission. The causes of "destitution," or more generally of "poverty," have been more carefully distinguished; and one universal service has given place to a number of different services, each providing the appropriate treatment for a different type of need. Old Age Pensions, the Health Insurance Acts, and the development of Public Hospitals, School Meals and Clothing, the Treatment of the Blind are all cases in point. These new services have been created largely from national funds, though of some of them part of the cost has been borne by local rates, or by contributions from the beneficiaries. Administratively, also, changes have been effected. The new services have been related to central government more closely than was the old Poor Law, and by the Act of 1929 what remained of the Poor Law was removed from the control of parish Boards of Guardians elected *ad hoc*, and under the name of Public Assistance was placed under the charge of the local government authorities of counties and county boroughs.

2. "Public Assistance" is obviously a term appropriate to every form of support given from public funds to the satisfaction of the needs of individual or family life. Every tenant of a "subsidised" house, every parent whose children are educated in an "aided" school, every University student, every Old Age Pensioner—all of these are quite strictly in receipt of "Public Assistance." And the re-naming, as well as the administrative reorganization of this residual service of providing relief in cash or in kind for those whose means fall short of the requirements of subsistence, was certainly intended to bring about a closer adjustment of this with other social services, as well as to facilitate the more accurate assignment of those who have recourse to

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its aid. Nevertheless, the newer Public Assistance has retained certain of the features of the Poor Law service. To a far greater degree than any other, it is still a local service, financed almost wholly out of local rates, administered by the local authority with relatively little central supervision or control. And it is the service of last resort—in two senses. All cases which can be treated by other agencies are so treated: the Public Assistance service exists to deal only with those for which no other service is available, or which cannot establish a claim upon an alternative. And it is the service to which, certainly until very recently, resort was made only with some degree of reluctance, and which sought to protect itself against unnecessary calls by imposing conditions which explain and perpetuate this attitude on the part of its beneficiaries. This element of "deterrence" has been slow to disappear; but in relation to many Poor Law services—those connected with sickness or old age, for example—it is now in large measure a thing of the past.¹ Only in one relation—and that, as it happens, the relation which confronts the Public Assistance service with its most difficult contemporary problem—is that element now of real importance. That relation concerns the treatment of the able-bodied unemployed. The real issue is whether this particular category of potential and actual claimants upon Public Assistance is to be dealt with by a development of the ordinary agencies of the Public Assistance service, and—with the modifications appropriate to their circumstances—under the limitations and conditions which have hitherto characterized that service; or whether a new service, otherwise organized and founded on other conceptions, has to be created for their benefit.

¹ Quite remarkable confirmation of this conclusion is furnished by the experience of the Merseyside Hospitals Council, a very large organization for collecting from wage-earners, by means of contributions of "1d. in the £," funds for the support of the voluntary hospitals. That experience shows that, except on strictly medical grounds, contributors and their dependants are just as ready, in case of illness, to enter the municipal—ex-Poor Law—hospitals, as to enter the voluntary hospitals.

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3. The precise form which this issue assumes may be made clear by a brief review of the present position. It is important to realize that this is, effectively, a new problem. Never before, on such a scale and for so prolonged a period, have we had to face the necessity of providing from public funds maintenance for unemployed workers ; and as will be seen, only during the last two or three years has this necessity thrown a really serious burden upon the Public Assistance service.

Unemployment has indeed always been a feature of large-scale industrial organization. In the first decade of this country two classic studies of its etiology were published by Sir William Beveridge¹ and by the 1905-9 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws ; and the practical treatment of it engaged the attention of successive governments and the energies of students, reformers, and private agencies of all descriptions. But broadly, it is true to say that no one then concerned with the problem thought of it as presenting to the Public Assistance service the same kind of problem as it now appears to do. Some unemployment was discerned to be due to the personal defects—physical or moral—of individual workers. Such workers might find employment in times of notable prosperity, when demand was at its height. But they were liable to be displaced with any contraction of economic activity. Their employment and their employability were alike subnormal : so that they were hardly to be reckoned as in the full sense “able-bodied.” With these, the Poor Law service—as well as other agencies—was seriously concerned : and the aim of Poor Law reform was to secure for them such classification and treatment as might lead to an improvement of personal quality.

For the rest, unemployment—the true unemployment of the “able-bodied”—presented itself, in Beveridge's phrase, as a “problem of industry,” arising from one or another species of industrial dislocation. The remedy was

¹ “*Unemployment*”—a *Problem of Industry*, 1908.

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to be sought in a progressive improvement of the organization of industry—on one side by evening out, through various devices, the curve of demand, and on the other by increasing the mobility of labour. And the experienced dimensions of unemployment of this type were such that it seemed reasonable, in the matter of actual assistance to the temporarily displaced, to look to schemes for providing a "spread-over" of earnings, so that there would be for each worker a reserve against emergency. To put the point in an extreme, but not misleading way, it might be said that the pre-War unemployment of the able-bodied was thought to raise not so much a problem to the public service charged with the relief of distress, as a challenge to the organizers of industry. If, with the aid of other public services, they did their job properly, industry might hope, so to say, to consume its own smoke, and leave the relieving authority to deal only with need of a different character. Nor was this view without reasonable foundation in the facts of the economic development of the country. Industrial depressions, of course, had been a regularly recurrent feature, some of them prolonged and obstinate, involving severe hardship and distress. But these had passed—apparently with the same inevitability as they had come. Technological advances had been made from time to time, of a kind which threw out of employment great numbers of skilled workers: changes in demand had occurred, so that whole industries had disappeared; towns and districts, once prosperous, had found their occupation gone. Yet, over the country as a whole, and for more than a century, the broad record was one of continuous expansion. Industry (and emigration) had been able to find employment at a slowly rising level of real wages—not only for those who had been displaced through all these changes, but for the natural increase of the population.

4. In that context it is perhaps not surprising that the public provision for the assistance of the able-bodied un-

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employed was of the most exiguous character. Until 1930, in England an able-bodied man could not legally be relieved otherwise than by entering the workhouse. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as the prevalence of industrial distress, could the family of an able-bodied man receive relief outside the workhouse, and then upon condition that he himself either entered the workhouse or performed a labour test.¹ In Scotland, until 1921, the Poor Law Authority had no legal power to give to able-bodied persons, whether employed or unemployed, relief of any kind. It is true that in neither country, especially after 1921, was the law quite strictly enforced. And because of the fact that between 1911 and 1921, unemployment in this country was of negligible amount, no great difficulty arose. Only after the collapse of the post-War boom were the first signs of the onset of a serious problem clearly discernible ; and from 1921 onwards, it became necessary to effect considerable changes both of practice and of outlook. Even after 1921, for some years, the magnitude of the problem was masked. It was not until about the time of the coming into operation of the administrative changes wrought by the Local Government Act of 1929 that Public Assistance Authorities really felt the pressure of large-scale unemployment. Unemployment had been prevalent : though not to the extent which we have known since the slump of 1930. But by far the greater part of the burden was borne by another agency than the Poor Law.

5. As has been indicated, the 1909 Report in dealing with recurrent industrial unemployment diagnosed two conditions which could be so treated as to diminish the severity of the problem. The establishment of a national system of Labour Exchanges, in 1909, was the main device chosen to increase the mobility of labour : the subsequent (1911) much more limited and experimental establishment of a scheme of Unemployment Insurance was the device chosen to rein-

¹ Local Government Board Order, 1911.

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force existing methods of providing a "carry-over" of income between one wage-earning job and another. Prior to this scheme, and apart from recourse either to charity or to the Poor Law, the unemployed worker was dependent on his savings, or upon such out-of-work payments as he might be entitled to draw from his trade society. Thereafter, if only for a particular group of workers, another resort was available. On proved involuntary unemployment, an insured worker could draw "benefit."

Nothing could be more instructive to a student of political action than a comparison of the development of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme in the years subsequent to 1921 with the documents and speeches which defined its purpose and recommended its adoption in 1911. Those responsible for the formulation of the measure were remarkably prescient. They foresaw almost all the risks and contingencies to which such a scheme would be exposed: and in the scheme itself, they made provision against them. Broadly, the history of the scheme, during the period of severe unemployment, is simply the record of the relaxation by Parliament of one after another of the limitations and conditions which the authors of the scheme had most deliberately inserted, and upon which the solvency and public credit of the system depended. There is no need here to examine the causes of this development. The ambiguity of the word "Insurance" itself was certainly one of them. Another was the prevailing misconception as to the nature of the unemployment with which this country was confronted. It was natural enough that successive governments, under the compulsion of providing maintenance for unemployed workers over an emergency which they believed or hoped to be temporary, should avail themselves of the services of an agency already familiar with the business of unemployment payments—all the more so as the use of that agency half concealed for the time being the magnitude and costliness of the service. In the circumstances the end was inevitable.

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A system of Contributory Insurance, which in its early days had been falsely called the "dole," came, over the larger part of its operation, to merit that designation. By 1930 it was financially bankrupt, and—in some measure unjustly—morally discredited.

It became clear, beyond all peradventure, that a system of Contributory Insurance could be maintained only if the conditions of entry to the scheme were properly defined and regulated, and if its liabilities were limited in amount and in time. Insurance, in other words, could do what its authors contemplated, and no more. It could provide "carry-over" payments in the interval—even in a fairly long interval—between one job and another: it could not cope with prolonged chronic unemployment. That was a problem of another kind, to be dealt with by another agency: and outside the Insurance Scheme the only other available agency was the local Public Assistance service.

6. Any reform or restoration of the Insurance Scheme was bound, therefore, to have the effect of transferring to the Public Assistance service many who had previously been provided for by the Insurance System. But in the measures of 1931 care was taken—very properly—to prevent the full operation of this tendency. By various stages the distinction between insurance and relief was established: but under the name of Transitional Payments the relief service continued its close association with the Insurance System, and remained chargeable to the National Exchequer. In part, however, the expected effect has been experienced, and more recently, with the stricter administration of the rules governing Transitional Payments, at a gradually accelerated pace.

7. The map of the present system of providing for the able-bodied unemployed is now clear. The service is shared by three agencies. First, the Insurance System deals with those, about 1,000,000 in number (September 1933), who, having satisfied the contributory and other

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conditions, have not suffered unemployment so prolonged as to exclude them from benefit. At the other end of the scale are those who have never been within the Insurance System—agricultural workers, for example, or those who have been in business on their own account—or who, having been within it, have lost their eligibility. These, perhaps 170,000 to 200,000 in number, are dealt with wholly by the local Public Assistance service. In between, there is an intermediate class, also about 1,000,000 in number, who come within the scope of the scheme of Transitional Payments. This service is available only for those who have been within the Insurance Scheme, i.e. for those who have been employed in an "insurable" occupation, and have some chance, however thin, of being so employed again. Their situation differs from that of recipients of Public Assistance in that they receive their benefit at the Employment Exchange, and wholly at the cost of the national exchequer. But it differs from that of the recipients of standard benefit in that they receive not a fixed payment, but an amount determined by the local Public Assistance Committee, very much on the basis of the practice of that Committee in assessing the needs of applicants for relief from its own funds, and subject to the provision that the amount allowed shall not exceed the amount of standard benefit.

The anomalies of this improvisation, hastily erected in the crisis of 1931, might be tolerable if the unemployment figures were falling more rapidly. But though the fall is undoubted, the second and third categories are still too large, and are certain to remain too large, for matters to remain as they are. What, then, is the permanent provision to be like?

8. It is reasonably certain that a Contributory Insurance System will remain, on a basis more nearly self-balancing than before. It is easy to point to the ambiguities, limitations, and defects of the conception of "Insurance." They are real enough. But the substantial facts are (i) that

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Insurance is a convenient device whereby industry can be made to carry at a cost which is not felt to be too onerous, the burden of meeting the first incidence of unemployment ; and (ii) that it offers to the unemployed worker a determinate payment, without enquiry into his needs or circumstances, under conditions which leave him a fair measure of freedom in the choice of his next employment. If the scheme begins with its liabilities defined, and has the luck to find not too heavy weather in its first few years, there is no doubt that ultimately it can cover a large proportion of normal short-term unemployment. Whatever the ultimate fate of Insurance, it is safe at the moment to assume its continuance.

9. The real difficulty arises with the scheme for non-contributory relief. If, as is certain, the cost of this service is to be met wholly from public funds, there can be no strong justification for limiting it to the class of "insured" workers, and the already shaky ground for the present artificial distinction between Transitional Payments and Public Assistance disappears. The main practical merit of the present scheme is that it puts by far the greater part of the cost upon national and not upon local funds. Unquestionably that feature must be retained in any new scheme. Otherwise the burden will fall in even greater disproportion than at present upon the areas already impoverished by heavy unemployment ; and will still further diminish the prospect of their industrial recovery.

10. But the fundamental issue is not as to the distribution of the burden, or as to the administrative arrangements, complicated and important as these are. It is as to the basis on which these relief payments are to be made—a matter on which considerations of political principle are so crossed and intermingled with matters of administrative expedience and practicability that dogmatisms, one way or another, are little enough in place.

11. We may begin with the political issue—the question

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as to the conception which is to govern the whole system—determining, as far as may be, both standards and method. Broadly, in relation to other recipients of Public Assistance, this matter of basic principle has been settled, almost without explicit decision, in the course of the development of the service. All whose need is due to some casualty or to bodily or mental subnormality, including the aged and children who cannot earn for themselves, are regarded as patients, i.e. as entitled to maintenance on a standard which provides the elementary conditions of physical preservation or restoration. The standard has risen—more rapidly than the general standard of life among wage-earners—and if it be still meagre enough, that is due, not to any general doubt as to the social desirability of a higher standard, but to the real or supposed financial difficulty of making it effective. Restraints of various sorts may be imposed upon certain categories of these beneficiaries : and in the public interest still further restraints may be imposed upon them in the future. But as to their individual standards of life, it is not seriously in dispute that within the limits of financial practicability their needs should be met as completely as possible, and with the minimum of administrative restriction.

12. These classes, however, have one common quality. It is that they are defined by an easily verifiable and quite objective characteristic. Age, sickness, blindness, are conditions whose presence or absence is matter more of fact than of degree. Only in a relatively small minority of marginal cases is it difficult to decide the question of qualification in terms of a simple "yes" or "no." But the matter is otherwise with the able-bodied unemployed. Neither of the elements of this compound term is capable of quite precise definition¹ : and the class to whom the term applies is not selectable by some plain objective criterion. A man may regard himself as unemployed—and is indeed so re-

¹ It is remarkable that nowhere in the long series of Unemployment Insurance Acts is there a definition of "Unemployment."

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garded at least for a time for purposes of Unemployment Insurance—not because he cannot get work, but because he cannot get work in the occupation which he has been accustomed to follow at the wage which he has been accustomed to receive. Again, the guarantee of a minimum subsistence during disablement or ill-health will induce few people willingly to incur mental or physical injury of a kind which will attract support from public sources. (Malingering, of course, is a well-known phenomenon. But that is a different thing from genuine disability, and is fairly easily controllable.) Unemployment is in a different case. To meet it with an assured minimum subsistence is to endow it, for a not negligible minority, with an attractiveness superior to that of working for a living. Hence, while provision for the needs of the blind or the aged will not increase the number of the blind or the rate at which people reach old age, provision for the unemployed will increase the number of the unemployed, by inducing some people to choose that condition rather than the alternative.

13. It is natural enough, therefore, that, in relation to the able-bodied unemployed, opinion has not yet reached the same measure of unanimity on the primary questions of the basis and standards of relief.

The main point may perhaps be put in the form of a query as to whether the whole conception of relief is here appropriate. In the ordinary course, relief is a matter of discretion. The relieving authority has to be satisfied in each case that the need for it exists, and provides it in the form and under the conditions judged to be suitable. The basis of the payment is less in the right of the individual to claim a specific sum on the occurrence of specific conditions, than in the acknowledged duty of the community from its corporate resources to help those whose essential needs cannot be met in other ways. It has been contended that the conception of relief thus circumscribed is not applicable to the situation of the unemployed worker ; that the duty

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of the State is not simply to provide, in case of need, the variable payments necessary to maintain a minimum level of subsistence, but rather to acknowledge the status of the worker as such in the community and to secure that his involuntary unemployment carries with it no avoidable limitation of his social privileges or of his standard of living. The argument is simple. The wealth of the community is the product of the efforts of all workers therein. Every worker, in contributing to that wealth, acquires a claim upon the total, proportioned to some very rough and ready estimate of the value of his contribution. If through no fault of his own he is denied the opportunity to make his contribution, that is no ground for withdrawing from him his claim to a share in the whole. He is willing, even eager, to work : if his services cannot be used or are not needed, the responsibility rests not upon him but upon the economic organization which fails to use him. The loss, therefore, if loss there be, must fall upon society as a whole, not upon the individual worker.

He is entitled to retain intact his claim to his accustomed share in the national income. His title is not unconditional. He must be, and must keep himself, fit for work. He must be ready to accept any suitable employment which is provided for him. If he fails in either respect he loses his claim and may rightly be treated otherwise than is here desiderated. But until his default is proved, i.e. until he has definitely refused an offer of suitable work, or until his bodily or moral efficiency can plainly be shown to prevent his making a normal contribution to the economic welfare of society, he ought to receive a standard of maintenance as nearly as possible approximating to that which he enjoyed in work. The State owes him an acknowledgment of his right either "to work or to maintenance."¹

14. It is not to be denied, perhaps few people would

¹ Compare the evidence of the Trade Union Congress to the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, 1931. *Minutes*, vol. iii, p. 967.

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wish to deny, that under present conditions there are many thousands of cases of unemployment where such an acknowledgment would be appropriate, and it is certain that considerations of this nature should powerfully affect the planning and administration of any new system. Any defensible scheme must go as far as is reasonably possible in meeting the claims of workers of this type. But it does not follow that there is here sufficient ground for a complete abandonment in relation to the able-bodied unemployed of the whole principle of discretionary relief and the substitution therefor of the system of statutory payments made under rules (on the model, say, of Old Age Pensions), on proof of unemployment. The difficulties and dangers confronting any such policy are impressive.

15. Two preliminary points may be noted. One is that not the least part of the attractiveness of a scheme of contributory insurance is that in some considerable measure it meets the requirements of precisely this type of situation. The second is that, however involuntary a man's unemployment may be, it is certain that the State cannot guarantee to him during unemployment maintenance on the same standard as during employment. It may be taken as axiomatic, and is probably so taken even by the proponents of this policy, that under no circumstances can the wages of unemployment be made in general equal to the wages of employment.

16. Neither of these points, however, touches the issue of principle, though they are indicative of the difficulties in the way. The most crucial is the matter of selection. The policy of "work or maintenance" is recommended only in relation to genuine involuntary unemployment. The assumption is that the great bulk of long-term unemployment is, and, if this policy were adopted, would continue to be, of the type which can properly be met by a State grant, approximating to standard maintenance. But the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment is very hard to draw. It is not to be doubted that in

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all but a tiny minority of cases, present-day unemployment is in a very real sense involuntary. It is not in all cases equally involuntary. Nevertheless, the alternatives to employment are not now so attractive as to make plausible the belief that there is much unemployment which could be described as "voluntary." On the other hand, there is much more room for doubt whether ordinary industrial employment, on the terms customarily prevailing, is a mode of life which most men would willingly choose if their maintenance were provided in some other way. If unemployment brought with it no noticeable economic hardship, a powerful safeguard to the maintenance of productive efficiency among the employed would be removed. There would be less incentive to a man to strive to recover employment when he had lost it, or to keep his employment when he had it. Widespread deterioration would be a far from remote possibility.

17. True, the State has a safeguard. Let it offer a man a job. If he refuses, he is a defaulter, and loses his eligibility. But, again, it is doubtful how effective this safeguard would prove. The State itself has a small minority of posts in its own control—including the defence services and the whole personnel of national and local government, not more than 10 per cent. of the national total. No immediately foreseeable enlargement of the range of ordinary public enterprise would very much affect the proportion. If, therefore, the State is to use at all the safeguard of an offer of work, it must bring within its control the whole business of the recruitment of labour for private enterprise. This would require much more than that employers should be compelled to fill all vacancies through the Employment Exchanges—in itself, at present, a quite impracticable procedure. For in each case it would be necessary for the State to determine whether the conditions offered were such that an unemployed worker could not reasonably refuse them. There would be no avoiding State supervision of,

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and control over, the details of industrial arrangements to a degree for which, at present, it has neither the technique nor the disposition.

18. The governing consideration is, then, that this criterion of willingness to work, doubtfully efficacious in itself, could not be operated without a complete transformation of our methods of industrial organization. That is quite a natural corollary. Broadly, the policy of "relief" rests on the thesis that the responsibility for earning a livelihood is best left to the individual himself. It is his business to find or to create the opportunity for work, in return for which he receives his claim upon the national income—the business of the State being to help him to carry that responsibility at the point and to the extent to which help is shown to be necessary.

The alternative policy of "work and maintenance" rests on the thesis that it is the State's duty, as completely as possible, to organize the whole economic life of society so that, on condition that it may call for such service as it requires, it is directly responsible for the economic welfare of every normal member of society. The general question as to the merits of these two competing theses is not here under discussion. The truth, perhaps, lies in neither of them taken by itself, but in a synthesis of the two: the precise form of the synthesis at any given time being determined by the actual stage of development achieved by economic and political organization. The relevant point is much simpler—that it is impossible in respect of unemployment arising under one system to make arrangements which are practicable only under a system of another type. To try to do so would be in some sort to make the worst of both worlds. We should thereby maintain intact a system of which over 90 per cent. of its range depends for its effective operation on the widely diffused exercise of individual initiative, and at the same time withdraw the individual worker from the greater part of the necessity of exercising that initiative. The consequence is not really in doubt.

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19. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that under existing or immediately foreseeable conditions the challenge to the older conception of "relief" fails. Forms of unemployment are too varying: the differences of personal quality among unemployed workers are too striking and too manifest to allow the assumption that all unemployment should be treated as if it were similar in type and in the same degree involuntary. In practice, therefore, the scheme of non-contributory unemployment payments may best be conceived not as a new system of statutory payments under rules, but as a new development of the general Public Assistance Service to which in varying measure the ordinary methods of inquiry and discretion are appropriate. But so to conclude is not to suggest that a discretionary system should be unaffected by the special nature of the problem with which it has to deal, or by the considerations which have been discussed. Much of the criticism to which, not unjustly, the administration of the present arrangements has been exposed is founded on the failure to make full use of discretionary powers. Real discretion implies the possibility of offering in some cases a higher standard of treatment as well as in other cases a lower. There is no reason why an effective service should not succeed in discriminating the cases in which, subject to the over-riding prudential rules of all relief services, high standards of treatment and conditions as little restrictive as possible would be appropriate. The criteria and methods of such an administration are not yet ready to hand. They must be developed in the course of experience and, no doubt, by the process of trial and error. But there need be no hesitation in believing that they are attainable and that indeed, in the light of the experience of the last few years, in many important matters they are already within reach.

20. What, then, must be sought is a service specially adapted to the situation of fit and willing unemployed workers, but yet conceived in terms of the relief of need. There

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remain some large questions of practical administrative procedure. There is, in particular, the question whether this service should be a specialization of the existing Public Assistance Service conducted on the responsibility of the local authority, or whether a new national Unemployment Assistance Service should be created. It is not easy here to distinguish between considerations of principle and considerations of expediency. There are good arguments on both sides.

21. It may be assumed in the first place that whatever the authority immediately responsible for administration, the cost in very large part must be borne by the National Exchequer. There is, therefore, a presumption in favour of administration by a national authority. It would not be easy, though it is perfectly possible, to devise a scheme by which the local authority can be entrusted with the spending of money which it does not raise. Again, a State scheme would avoid the difficulties which have been found to arise through the differences of standard adopted by the more than 200 different local authorities. There is the further fact that the State possesses in the Employment Exchanges an instrument already in touch with the whole number of the unemployed, familiar with such opportunities as there are of placing them in employment and accustomed to the work of making payments week by week to large numbers of applicants. In this respect also it may be taken for granted that whatever scheme be adopted, intimate contact must be maintained between unemployed workers and the Employment Exchanges. There are, therefore, notable attractions in the idea of a national service administered through, or in association with, the national system of Employment Exchanges.

22. There are, however, countervailing considerations. It is doubtful whether the Exchanges could long continue to administer both a system of contributory unemployment payments and a system of non-contributory relief. The

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lines of demarcation would be hard to maintain and there would be some risk of the breakdown of the contributory system. Nor, indeed, have the Exchanges any great experience of the technique of discretionary payment. To add to them a staff specially expert on that side would be to effect a considerable change in their outlook. But much more serious is the difficulty of securing under any centrally controlled system that measure of real discretion which is a main desideratum of the new service. A central service is subject to the control of a Minister who must answer in Parliament for every action of his department. It follows that that department must proceed by stated rule. All it can do is to apply to a given case the rules appropriate to that case ; variation or discrimination on individual circumstances is outside its province or its competence. Discretion, therefore, can be exercised effectively only by a body which is not subject to Parliamentary interrogation or to direction in detail, and which has a measure of independence. The appropriate bodies for that purpose are the local authorities which are at once the repositories of most of the experience of this work, and have in relation to central government a standing and tradition which enable them to take a real measure of independent responsibility.

There is the further point, that already the local authorities have at their disposal a range of institutions, educational, social, and industrial, which can be brought into use in connection with this service to any degree which is thought to be desirable. The aim of the service should be not simple payments, but the provision of such facilities for part-time employment, for training, and even for physical exercise as will help to maintain or to restore the industrial efficiency of the unemployed. That is an immense task. Both national and local authorities have already set their hands to it, and it will call for the full co-operation of both. But the local authorities have many more agencies under

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their control, and can take the initiative over a larger part of the field.

23. These two sets of considerations must be weighed against one another. On the whole, the balance appears to favour a local service. But two points are essential. The first is that no mere enlargement of the existing Public Assistance Service will meet the case. What is wanted is definitely a new development working out methods of administration and standards of treatment appropriate to the particular problem with which it is concerned. For this purpose it would be convenient that there should be brought into existence a special Committee of the local authority charged exclusively with this service, but able easily to maintain a close liaison with other branches of Public Assistance and with the general services of the local authority. The second is that in respect of this service, the relation between central and local government must be more intimate than it is in respect of other Public Assistance Services. This requirement is dictated first by the fact that ultimately, if indirectly, by far the greater part of the cost of this service must be borne by the State : it ought, therefore, to be in continuous touch with the practice of local administration, so that it may be assured as to the adequacy of the service provided. Again, by the same method, it will be possible to bring into a reasonable measure of uniformity the standards of administration adopted by the different local authorities. Identity of standard is neither desirable nor attainable : but there is no justification for the degree of variation which exists at the present time. There need be no difficulty here. The experience of the administration of Transitional Payments has shown what can be done ; and if the responsible Minister—for many reasons the Minister of Labour—is equipped with larger powers of general guidance, inspection, and direction, as well as with his present power of supersession, he can achieve all the uniformity that is desirable without

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undermining the independence of the local authorities.

24. These, in barest outline, appear to be the alternatives. Arguments are heard at times, favouring now one side and now the other, on the ground of the desirability of removing this question out of the sphere of local or of national politics. No doubt "relief" is a dangerous question in politics, and corruption is easy enough. But in truth there is no way by which this matter can be taken out of politics, and there is a good deal to be said for a system which makes it a concern of both local and national government, rather than exclusively of either.

But whichever alternative be finally chosen, the actual method must be in large part experimental. The last ten years—and in particular the last three years—have furnished much experience, most of it of a negative kind. There is ample room for positive constructive work. It will be in every way lamentable if the problem is approached with any kind of presumption that the proper objective of policy is to find the cheapest solution. Finance is not to be disregarded. But mere "economy" is a short-sighted attitude. If that prevails, then any attempt to treat this complicated, difficult, and by no means temporary problem on lines that will make for an improvement both of the national estate and of national morale will be doomed to failure from the outset.

RECENT THEORIES OF EXOGAMY

By EDWARD WESTERMARCK

BY exogamy I understand the rule which forbids the members of a particular group to marry any other member of it. The exogamous group is in most cases composed of persons who are, or consider themselves to be, related by blood or of the same kin ; and the nearer the relationship the more frequently it is a bar to intermarriage, at least within the same line of descent. The term "exogamy" is generally used for a prohibition of marrying inside a larger group than one merely consisting of members of the same family, particularly the clan ; but neither in the etymology of the word, nor in the nature of the prohibitions, can I find any ground for such a restriction. On the contrary, it has the disadvantage of dissociating rules that belong to the same class and, in my opinion, have the same foundation.

No problem relating to the history of marriage has led to a greater variety of attempted solutions than the origin of the exogamous rules. They have—to mention only some of the more important of those hypotheses—been ascribed to a pristine habit of female infanticide ; to the vain desire of savage men to have trophies in their wives ; to experience of the injurious influence of inbreeding (made at an earlier stage of human development than that represented by any living savages but afterwards forgotten) ; to marriage by capture originating in the hypothetical period of primitive promiscuity ; to marriage by purchase ; to a superstitious belief that incest blights the crops, prevents the multiplication of edible animals, and renders the women sterile ; to totemism ; or to the furious jealousy of a gorilla-like ancestor. I have criticized these theories in the last edition of my book *The History of Human Marriage*. In the present essay I shall discuss some others which have appeared after its publication.

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While Atkinson and Freud derive the rule of exogamy from the jealousy of the father in the primitive group, Dr. Briffault derives it, in particular, from the jealousy of the mother, though her jealousy was of a different type. According to him, the constitution of primitive human groups was not patriarchal, but matriarchal, and the observance of the rule of exogamy was an essential condition of the preservation of that maternal character of the group. "If the women left their family to join their husbands, that family would cease to be a maternal group; if the men were the sexual mates as well as the brothers of the women, patriarchal succession would be established, and their authority and rivalry would bring about patriarchal dominance also." Primitive peoples who have retained the matriarchal constitution are profoundly averse to allowing any of their girls or women to leave the group, whereas the men are not essential to the continuity of it, being but offshoots of the main female stem of which the group, as a stable unit, consists. The rules that govern the constitution of the maternal group are in harmony with the spontaneous instincts and dispositions which are the source of that social constitution. While girls are in all primitive societies naturally tied, so to speak, to their mothers' apron-strings, the instincts of the young male impel him to wander in search of change, of food, of adventure. Those conditions made for the association of males from neighbouring groups with females who remained in their own group. And a habit, hardened into a traditionally established rule that males shall seek their sexual partners in another group, gave rise to a corresponding rule that they shall not seek their sexual partners in the group to which they themselves belong.

But that prohibition was reinforced by another manifestation of the maternal instincts which determined the constitution of the primitive human group. The unparalleled development of those instincts to which the biological

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conditions of early human development were due implied as a correlate a corresponding tendency to jealousy in their exercise. The transference of the son's attachment and dependence to another woman would have been the most offensive blow to the jealous love of the mother and the authority she claimed over her sons. So "to the young male, terror-stricken by the anger of a despotic mother, no other course was open than to find surreptitiously the means of satisfying his most imperative impulses and to wander away from the family group in search of a female."¹

Dr. Briffault says that the impulses of the primitive mother were wholly unreasonable, unaffected by rational considerations or foresight. Yet one would think she had enough foresight to understand that if her son was not allowed to mate inside his own group he would seek a sexual partner in another group, and that she would thereby lose all influence over him instead of merely having to share her influence with her daughter. I also fail to see why matriarchal succession should come to an end if the men were both the sexual partners and the brothers of the women. Nor can I reconcile what Dr. Briffault says about "the mother of the group" with other statements made by him, to the effect that matrilineal marriage, which "was the original form of marriage union,"² was not in the beginning individual; that "the regulation of collective sexual relations between given groups has everywhere preceded any regulation of those relations between individual members of those groups,"³ that "in their origin marriage regulations had no reference to such individual relations, but to relations between groups."⁴ Did the mother's prohibition of brother-and-sister incest refer to relations between groups? Dr. Briffault has even tried to prove that there was a primitive group-motherhood.⁵

The incest prohibition is thus supposed to apply primarily

¹ R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, i (London, 1927), pp. 250 sqq.

² *Ibid.*, i, p. 307.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, p. 607.

³ *Ibid.*, i, p. 766.

⁵ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 597 sqq.

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to relations between brothers and sisters. Dr. Briffault says that in the simplest forms of deliberate exogamic devices, such as are found among some of the Australian tribes, "which are divided into two intermarrying classes, while that organization prevents marriage between brothers and sisters, it does not oppose any artificial obstacle to incest between parents and children." He also refers to a couple of cases in which unions between father and daughter are regarded as quite legitimate, whereas the strictest prohibition exists in regard to unions between brother and sister. The same cases have been previously mentioned by myself¹; but if he had taken sufficient notice of my list of peoples who are reported to practise, at least occasionally, incest between the nearest relatives, he would have found that the prohibition of it is not less, but more, general in regard to parents and children than in regard to brothers and sisters.² The former rule is accounted for in a few lines: "When the character of the mother in the primitive human group is apprehended, it is easy to understand that the awe and dread attaching to the maternal head of the family, who imposed her veto against relations between brothers and sisters, should render it even less likely that she should herself be a possible object of incestuous advances. Her instincts would equally oppose relations between father and daughters."³ Of course, the mother would not allow her son to rape her. But Dr. Briffault must be aware of the fact that elderly women are not unfrequently sexually attracted by young men; and we may imagine that this was also the case with the primitive mother in regard to her son, if, as Dr. Briffault says, the restraining effects of habitual association upon the sexual instincts which we notice among ourselves have no bearing upon the operation of those instincts in savage humanity.⁴ His explanation of the taboo

¹ *The History of Human Marriage*, ii (London, 1921), pp. 84 sq.

² *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 82 sqq.

³ Briffault, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 257 sq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 247 sq.

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relating to father-and-daughter incest presupposes, of course, that the mother of the group was strong enough to impose it. Like his explanations of the other incest prohibitions, it rests on his theory of a primitive stage of matriarchy, which I consider completely untenable.

While according to Dr. Briffault the incest prohibition applies primarily to relations between brothers and sisters, Mrs. Seligman maintains that "the parent-child type is the fundamental incest law," though "the brother-sister type is an auxiliary to it."¹ She argues as follows: "A sexual relationship between parent and child would be dangerous to the family group, quite apart from the directly sexual jealousies that such a situation would cause, for the child would then be raised to the social level of the parent, who could no longer exercise the authority due to the senior generation. From this point of view intercourse of father and daughter would upset the parent-child relationship and disturb the balance of [the] family group, just as much as intercourse on the part of the son with the mother or with his father's other wives. . . . The blow to parental authority would be so great that the family group could hardly survive. If, on the other hand, a social law can be accepted which at the same time protects the mother from the son and the daughter from the father, the authority of both parents can be maintained over the children until they seek mates outside the family and themselves gain the social status of seniors without encroaching on that of their parents. The father keeps his authority over the family by accepting a rule which deprives him of intercourse with his daughter. In doing so the father gives up a real advantage, for there can be no doubt that very young girls are attractive to mature men."²

¹ Brenda Z. Seligman, "Incest and Descent: Their Influence on Social Organization," in *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, lix (London, 1929), p. 368.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 243 sq. The same argument is repeated in Mrs. Seligman's article, "The Incest Barrier: Its Rôle in Social Organization," in *The British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, xxii (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 259 sq.

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This argument is based on the assumption that sexual relations are antagonistic to authority. What about the husband's authority over his wife? Among the lower races, as a rule, a woman is always more or less in a state of dependence; when she is emancipated from the power of the head of her family she generally passes into the power of her husband; and from the civilized world we likewise hear of the rule that the husband shall command and the wife obey. There are in the sexual impulse itself elements that lead to domination on the part of the man and to submission on the part of the woman: in the male it is connected with a desire to win the female, and in the female with a desire to be pursued and won by the male. The most judicious student of the psychology of sex, Dr. Havelock Ellis, observes: "While in men it is possible to trace a tendency to inflict pain, or the simulacrum of pain, on the women they love, it is still easier to trace in women a delight in experiencing physical pain when inflicted by a lover, and an eagerness to accept subjection to his will. Such a tendency is certainly normal. To abandon herself to her lover, to be able to rely on his physical strength and mental resourcefulness, to be swept out of herself and beyond the control of her own will, to drift idly in delicious submission to another and stronger will—this is one of the commonest aspirations in a young woman's intimate love-dreams."¹ There is thus no reason at all to suppose that sexual relations between a father and his daughter should weaken his authority over her. At the same time they may cause jealousy on the part of the mother and the father's other wives, if he has more than one. That this, however, would not upset the family group is proved by the fact that polygamy is a recognized institution among an enormous number of peoples. In fact, it seems that domestic troubles are more easily averted if the wives are chosen from the same family, as they not unfrequently are. We often hear that a man who wishes to have several wives

¹ Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, iii (Philadelphia, 1923), p. 89.

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by preference marries sisters for the very purpose of securing more domestic peace¹; and among some people—such as the Onas of Tierra del Fuego,² the Chiriguano of Gran Chaco,³ the Caribs,⁴ the Negritos of Zambales,⁵ and the Maori of New Zealand⁶—we find marriages with two women who are mother and daughter. Again sexual relations between a son and his mother would cause jealousy on the part of the father. In Tibet father and son sometimes share the same wife, but only on condition that she shall not be the son's mother⁷; and according to Cæsar the ancient Britons practised “a form of community of wives, ten or twelve combining in a group, especially brothers with brothers and fathers with sons.”⁸ But such practices are possible only among a polyandrous people, and irregular sexual connections between a son and his mother would be no more tolerated by the father than similar connections between his wife and any other man. Whether a son's incest with his mother would weaken her authority over him is thus a question which need not be considered at all—the less so since among savages she has no such authority after the son has reached the age of puberty.

With regard to the taboo relating to brother-and-sister incest, Mrs. Seligman argues that “when the father accepted a barrier between himself and his daughter it is unlikely that he would permit his sons to take the very mates whom social pressure had caused him to renounce. The triumph of the sons over the father in mating with the sister would be unbearable, and considering the probable immaturity of the latter it would be unlikely that they could succeed

¹ *The History of Human Marriage*, iii, pp. 94 sq.

² A. Cojazzi, *Los indios del Archipiélago Fueguino* (Santiago de Chile, 1914), p. 16.

³ G. E. Church, *Aborigines of South America* (London, 1912), p. 238.

⁴ J. B. Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Antilles*, ii (Paris, 1667), p. 378.

⁵ W. A. Reed, *Negritos of Zambales* (Manila, 1904), p. 61.

⁶ E. Best, “Maori Marriage Customs,” in *Transactions and Proceedings of the New Zealand Institute*, 1903, xxxvi (Wellington, 1904), p. 29.

⁷ Sarat Chandra Das, *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet* (London, 1904), p. 327.

Ch. A. Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderland* (London, 1906), p. 305.

⁸ Cæsar, *De bello Gallico*, v. 14.

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without their father's consent. If the fathers renounce all sexual approach to their daughters, the sons must do so too. Thus the brother-sister taboo imposed upon the younger generation by the father, not only prevents rivalry between brother and brother and between sister and sister, but it removes a second sphere of rivalry between father and son. The two incest taboos are therefore complementary to one another and together eliminate certain possible sources of disharmony within the family group."¹ Mrs. Seligman's explanation of the brother-and-sister taboo is thus in the first place an inference from her explanation of the father-and-daughter taboo, and if the premiss is untenable the conclusion must be untenable too. But apart from this, even if fathers had renounced all sexual approach to their daughters, there could be no sexual rivalry between them and their sons, nor is it easy to imagine that it was a universal characteristic of primitive fathers to grudge the latter a privilege which they themselves had forsaken; and the authority over their daughters they lost anyhow when they gave them in marriage to other men. Again, the supposition that there would be disturbing rivalry between brother and brother and sister and sister presupposes that no equally, if not more, acceptable mates could be found outside the family circle; and whatever psycho-analysts may say on the matter, I consider such an assumption completely unjustified. Mrs. Seligman also discusses exogamous rules relating to more distantly related persons. Like myself, she regards them as extensions of the two primary incest prohibitions, that between parent and child and that between brother and sister; I shall come back to them a little later.

With regard to her theory of the incest barrier Mrs. Seligman acknowledges her indebtedness to Professor Malinowski. According to him, the prohibition of incest is the result of two phenomena which spring up under

¹ Mrs. Seligman, in *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, xxii, pp. 261 sq. See also *Idem* in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, p. 246.

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human culture. "In the first place, under the mechanisms which constitute the human family serious temptations to incest arise. In the second place, side by side with the sex temptations, specific perils come into being for the human family, due to the existence of the incestuous tendencies." On the first point he agrees with Freud, but does not accept his theory that the infantile attachment to the mother is essentially sexual. The relation of the suckling to its mother is first of all induced by the desire for nutrition, while the bodily clinging of a child to its mother satisfies its bodily wants of warmth, protection, and guidance. But although the temptation of incest is not due to any sexual relation between the infant and its mother, there is a remarkable analogy between the preparatory actions of the sexual drive and the consummatory actions of the infantile impulse, consisting in the clinging to the mother's body in the fullest possible epidermic contact, above all in the contact of the child's lips with the mother's nipple; both kinds of actions are connected with sensuous pleasure derived from bodily contact. The caresses of lovers employ not only the same medium—epidermis; not only the same situation—embraces, cuddling, the maximum of personal approach; but they entail also the same type of sensuous feelings. When therefore this new type of drive enters it must invariably awaken the memories of earlier similar experiences. These memories are associated with the mother. With regard to this person the erotic life introduces disturbing memories which stand in direct contradiction to the attitude of reverence, submission, and cultural dependence which in the growing boy has already completely repressed the early infantile sentimental attachment. This blending of the new type of erotic sensuality with the memories of early life threatens to break up the organized system of emotions built up around the mother, by giving rise to temptation to incest.¹

¹ B. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (London, 1927), pp. 244 sqq.

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In support of his theory Professor Malinowski argues that "we can borrow from psycho-analysis the principle which has now become generally accepted in psychology that there are no experiences in later life which would not stir up analogous memories from infancy." But Freud says that, in most people, a peculiar oblivion veils the first six or eight years of existence.¹ Not even savages, among whom the suckling period often lasts for two or three years, could have any memory either of "the contact of the child's lips with the mother's nipple," or of "the permanent clinging to the mother's body in the fullest possible epidermic contact." How, then, could those infantile actions, unaccompanied by any sexual desire, be a source of temptation to incest in later life? According to Freud, it is not a memory, but the repressed infantile incest desire, that becomes active at puberty, then strengthened by the bodily development. So far, then, there would be no reason to suppose that the temptation to incest with the mother is greater than the temptation to sexual intercourse with any other woman of her age; and this could not be very great. Professor Malinowski might have considered what his Trobriand Islanders told him when he asked them if they ever had erotic dreams relating to their mothers. The answer was a calm, unshocked negation: "The mother is forbidden—only an imbecile would dream such a thing. She is an old woman. No such thing would happen."² Speaking of the same islanders, he says that although they consider sexual intercourse with the father's own sister emphatically right and proper, it is not frequently practised, and that marriage with her, although permissible and even desirable, seems never to occur. This he explains by the remark that "she belongs to a previous generation, and, as a rule, what remains of her sexual endowment is not attractive."³ Does not exactly the same apply to the mother?

¹ S. Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Leipzig & Wien, 1926), p. 49.

² Malinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³ *Idem*, *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia* (London, 1929), p. 450.

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Another natural check upon incestuous desires may be the son's respect for his mother, in so far as it tends to increase in this case that feeling of aversion to sexual intercourse between persons who have been living closely together from the childhood of one or both of them, which, in my opinion, is the ultimate cause of all incest prohibitions. Professor Malinowski does not agree with me that there is any such feeling.¹ Yet I believe that it is that very feeling which has suggested the idea that son-and-mother incest is incompatible with filial reverence. That sexual feelings and behaviour are not by themselves inconsistent with the emotion of respect appears from its frequent occurrence in the relation between husband and wife.

Finally, it should be noticed that the jealousy which this kind of incest would arouse in the father must be a powerful obstacle to it. Altogether, then, the temptations to it could not have been very great.

On the origin of the other incest taboos Professor Malinowski has little to say. That incest must be forbidden because it is "incompatible with the establishment of the first foundations of culture," that without the prohibition of it "the family could not continue to exist," and there would be "complete social chaos and an impossibility of continuing cultural tradition."² Even if the practice of incest were attended with such disastrous consequences—it seems to have been quite common in ancient Egypt without being destructive either to culture or to the family—I cannot believe it was prohibited for fear of them. I think it was forbidden simply because it was repulsive to the feelings of the community—in other words, that the exogamous rules have fundamentally the same origin as other customs and laws which are expressions of public sentiments and punish acts that shock them.

A still later theory of the origin of exogamy comes from

¹ *Idem*, *Sex and Repression*, pp. 244, 245, 252.

² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

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Lord Raglan.¹ In an article published in 1931 he traced it to the belief that it is dangerous for a man to deflower a girl belonging to his own social group ; but why it was considered dangerous he could not tell, though he thought it quite possible that the belief had originated in a fear of bloodshed. Two years later he suggested that exogamy was connected with " a very ancient magical belief that it is dangerous to have intercourse with a woman who lives on the same side of the stream."² I must quote him verbatim : " I suppose that men became more and more frightened of menstruous women till they did not feel safe unless they had some obstacle between them and the women as a whole, and for this purpose utilised the stream on whose banks they lived ; all the men lived on one side, and merely visited the women on the other, taking with them some of the spoils of the chase. This would not last for very long ; old men would stay with the women, and old women with the men, and the idea might gradually arise that it was safe for people of both sexes to live on the same side so long as they did not have sexual intercourse. There was as yet no individual marriage—the divine king and queen were the first pair to be married—but the men would tend to visit the same women, those nearest to them on the opposite bank All this time, we may suppose, the belief in ancestral spirits had been slowly developing, and the danger from a breach of the menstrual taboo, which had formerly been supposed to come from the women themselves, or their blood, was in part transferred to the spirits, who thus became jealous guardians of the taboo. . . . A man from the other side was safe, because he could get safely back across the stream before the spirits, who are never very quick-witted, had realised what had happened, so all the ill-luck fell on the woman's own relatives."³

¹ Lord Raglan, " Incest and Exogamy," in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, lxi (London, 1931), p. 179.

² *Idem*, *Jocasta's Crime* (London, 1933), p. 191.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 124 sqq.

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Lord Raglan admits that there is perhaps not much evidence in favour of his theory, but says there is some. Thus, although a man who has had intercourse no longer crosses a stream, "he often takes care to avoid trouble from the evil spirits by performing a ritual ablution, and water, especially running or "living" water, is generally regarded as a powerful magical disinfectant"; and, moreover, "there are still a few cases in which exogamous moieties are separated by water."¹ Lord Raglan modestly says he does not claim that his theory is true, "for it is merely a guess." But his next sentence is less modest, for he does claim "that it is an improvement on previous theories in two respects; in the first place it attempts to account for all the features of the three early sexual taboos and not merely a few selected features of one selected taboo." These taboos are: a man must not have intercourse with a woman of his own exogamous group; he must not see, or have anything to do with, a menstruous woman; he must not see, or have anything to do with, his mother-in-law."²

Lord Raglan then ignores other sexual taboos which are generally considered to be most intimately connected with exogamy, as defined by him. Exogamy, he says, "means that a tribe is divided into two or more groups, usually totemic clans, and that members of the same group may not marry, even when there is no traceable relationship between them"³ (in another place he writes, all the same, that "exogamy must date from a time before marriage existed"⁴). This definition does not imply the prohibition of marriage between members of the same family who do not belong to the same clan; he blames me for confusing "with outbreeding the system of exogamy, which may permit . . . fathers to marry their own daughters, since under the matrilineal system the latter belong to their mothers' clan,"⁵ (in my own clearly defined use of the term "exogamy" the prohibition

¹ Lord Raglan, *Jocasta's Crime* (London, 1933), pp. 126 sq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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of such unions is included). Lord Raglan simply says that "the laws of incest" are in all probability based on exogamy, though they "introduce two new principles—that a child is a blood-relative to his father, and therefore cannot marry, e.g. his father's sister, and that a man is a blood-relation to his wife, and therefore cannot marry, e.g. his wife's sister" (!).¹ What about the prohibition of son-and-mother incest? Yet he has called his book *Jocasta's Crime*.

Again, if other writers have not mentioned the taboos imposed on women at menstruation in connection with exogamy, their omission is explained by the fact that no such connection is known to exist. What has the rule that menstruous women must not cross streams, in order not to pollute the water or scare the fish,² to do with exogamy? Lord Raglan imagines that the dread of menstruous women was so intense that it was considered dangerous for a man to have intercourse with any woman at any time; that it was particularly so if the man and the woman lived on the same side of the river; but that the danger was not so great if he visited a woman living on the other side of it, because he could then escape by outwitting the spirit guardians of the taboo, and get safely back across the stream. Lord Raglan also says that "fear of a breach of the menstrual taboo gradually developed into a belief that the ancestral spirits did not like the women of the group to be touched by strangers."³ How these fancies can lead up to a theory of exogamy, which presupposes, not surreptitious meetings, but, in all normal cases, the living together of husband and wife, I am unable to conceive. Nor do I understand Lord Raglan's other claim that his theory is an improvement on all previous theories because "it does not demand a sudden breach with the past, a thing which never happens either in savage or in civilized communities except under foreign influence."⁴ It is just a breach with the past under foreign

¹ Lord Raglan, *Jocasta's Crime* (London, 1933), p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 126.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 128.

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influence, due to the diffusion of culture, that he assumes ; he is compelled to do so since all exogamous communities do not live on river-banks. He writes : " We may conclude that the probability that any magical rite was devised in two different places is exceedingly remote, and that if the incest taboo was evolved from magical ideas, or practices, each of these originated in some one area, not necessarily the same one. There is no more justification for assuming that the natives of Central Africa invented the magical rites which they now practise than there is for assuming that they invented the bicycles which they now ride."¹ Lord Raglan's ambitious claims can scarcely be taken seriously.

All those writers whose theories of exogamy I have now examined have raised objections to the theory proposed by myself. Dr. Briffault misrepresents it by saying that I derive " the horror of incest from the lower stimulating effect of a household companion of childhood on the male sexual impulses."² What I have written is this : " Generally speaking, there is a remarkable absence of erotic feelings between persons living very closely together from childhood. Nay more, in this, as in many other cases, sexual indifference is combined with the positive feeling of aversion when the act is thought of."³ I do not speak of the operation of the sexual instinct in the male only ; Dr. Havelock Ellis may be right in saying that " this instinct is probably even more marked in the female."⁴ With regard to Dr. Briffault's criticism of my view, I may quote what Dr. Ellis says in reply to his criticism of his own view of the horror of incest, which is in general agreement with my own :⁵ " All this is, to an impartial observer, simple, natural, and universal. It represents the general rule, to which there are, of course, endless exceptions, early ' fixations,' more or less patholo-

¹ Lord Raglan, *Jocasta's Crime* (London, 1933), p. 135.

² Briffault, *op. cit.*, i, p. 244.

³ *The History of Human Marriage*, ii, p. 192.

⁴ H. Ellis, *Views and Reviews* (London, 1932), p. 168.

⁵ *Idem*, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, vii (Philadelphia, 1928), p. 505.

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gical, which are never overcome. To bring them forward, as Dr. Briffault does, to invalidate the general rule, is idle and scarcely intelligent."¹

The same may be said of Mrs. Seligman's criticism. She writes, "There seems little evidence for Westermarck's theory that house-mates are not mutually attractive, for brother-sister incest *does* take place in spite of the almost universal law against it."² It does not seem to have occurred to her that if exceptional cases of brother-and-sister incest can invalidate my theory of the prohibition of it, it can just as well invalidate her own; this, too, must refer to general cases only, since such incest *does* take place. She has also made another objection to my theory. She argues that if "the observance of the incest laws is a habit which has been formed within the family without any great difficulty, because the temptation was not severe [she adheres to the "superstition"—as Dr. Ellis calls it³—that the "formidable list of regulations testifies to the strength of the brother-sister temptation"⁴] . . . the sanction for exogamy and other marriage prohibitions becomes a greater mystery than ever. These laws divide the cousins in the most arbitrary manner into marriageable and non-marriageable persons, . . . and it is difficult to imagine how a supposed aversion to house-mates could form either the guiding sentiment for obedience to such rules or the force which led to their institution."⁵

I have certainly not omitted to discuss the question how "the supposed aversion to housemates" may lead to prohibition of marriage between cousins of different kinds, as well as between other related, and even unrelated, persons who are not members of the family in our sense of the term. I have pointed out that marriage between cousins has been prohibited by peoples among whom brothers and their

¹ H. Ellis, *Views and Reviews*, p. 167.

² Mrs. Seligman, in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, lix, p. 145.

³ H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, vii, p. 506.

⁴ Mrs. Seligman, in *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, xxii, p. 270.

⁵ *Idem*, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, lix, p. 213.

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children used to live in the same dwelling or otherwise in very close proximity, e.g. the Romans, Hindus, Welsh, and Southern Slavs, and that among savages an exogamous clan is very frequently a territorial group as well as a group of kindred.¹ But the members of the same clan are prohibited from intermarrying even though they do not live in the same locality. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons living closely together from childhood has been expressed in prohibitions against unions between kindred. The exogamous rules, though in the first place associated with kinship because near relatives normally live together, have come to include relatives who do not live together—a process in which the influence of a common name, signifying kinship, has undoubtedly been of great importance. This largely accounts for that division of cousins into marriageable and non-marriageable, which, on my theory, is said to remain a mystery. Very frequently the children of two brothers are not allowed to intermarry, nor the children of two sisters, although marriage between so-called cross-cousins—that is, the marriage of a man with his father's sister's daughter or with his mother's brother's daughter—is not prohibited. Where the clan system prevails cross-cousins belong to different clans, whether descent is patrilineal or matrilineal; whereas the children of two brothers belong to the same clan if descent is traced through the father, and the children of two sisters belong to the same clan if descent is traced through the mother. In the former case the children of two sisters also belong to the same clan if the sisters have married into that clan, and in the latter case the children of two brothers belong to the same clan if the brothers have married into that clan; but even when the children of brothers or the children of sisters belong to different clans they may stand to each other in a closer social relationship than the children of brother and sister, and

¹ *The History of Human Marriage*, ii, pp. 207 sqq.

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marriages between them may on that account be regarded as incest. That the extent of the prohibited degrees is closely connected with social intimacy, whether combined with actual living together or not, is suggested, amongst other things, by the regular co-existence of comprehensive exogamous prohibitions with classificatory terms of relationship, which I consider to be fundamentally influenced by social relationships.¹ And it seems to me highly probable that the same feelings of intimacy and kinship as have, for instance, led to the classification of cousins with brothers and sisters have also led to the rule which treats sexual intercourse between them as incest, while the identity of terms must have operated in the same direction. It is significant that cross-cousins, who are allowed to intermarry, are not addressed by the terms which are used for brother and sister. I have thus, like Mrs. Seligman, derived clan exogamy from the prohibition of brother-and-sister incest, and have done so very much on the same lines. The difference between our views lies mainly in our different explanations of the incest taboos within the family, and it is radical enough. My explanation of them may appear to her as a mystery; but the division of cousins into marriageable and non-marriageable cannot make it "a greater mystery than ever."

Lord Raglan's criticism is characteristic of the manner in which he discusses previous writers' theories of exogamy. He alleges that I postulate "an instinctive aversion to intercourse between those who have lived together," and is then able to make the "witty" remark (to quote the blurb on the jacket of his book) that I invite my readers "to regard the cohabitation of husband and wife as unnatural."² He omits to say that I speak of persons "living very closely together from childhood." His statement is based on the quotation (which, though put within inverted commas,

¹ *The History of Human Marriage*, i, pp. 250 sqq. ; ii, pp. 216 sq.

² Lord Raglan, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

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is far from literal) of a passage in which I contrast living together as housemates with blood-relationship ; and he has chosen to take it from one of the earlier editions of my book, although he is well aware of the last, completely rewritten edition of it. By doing so he has also been able to insert the word "instinctive" before "aversion," which he knows that I have dropped—chiefly in order to avoid useless controversy about the meaning of the term. But the essence of my theory has from the beginning been the influence which close living together from childhood has exercised on the sexual instinct ; and it seems incomprehensible how any one who has taken even the most superficial notice of it could have missed its fundamental point.

PREVISION IN RELIGION¹

By CHRISTOPHER DAWSON

THERE is no sphere of human activity in which prevision has had a wider scope than in that of religion. Indeed, religious prevision has always been one of the chief conditions and causes of religious change. The function of the religious prophet has been far more creative than that of the political prophet and possesses, as the latter does not, an organic relation to the process of development with which it is concerned. Nevertheless, this religious prevision is entirely different from the sociological prevision which is the subject of our discussion. It is not merely unscientific, it is essentially hostile to any prevision of religious development that is based on purely rational data. It asserts the word of God against the word of man, the invasion of the known by the unknown, the reversal of the human logic of history and its human values by the abrupt interposition of a transcendent principle.

Now, there is no doubt that of all forms of change, religious changes are apparently the most arbitrary and the most unpredictable. A political revolution, however sudden and catastrophic it may be, has a firm basis in the past, and all its elements are to be found existing in the previous state of society. But there is an unknown quantity in religious change which defeats the most careful historic analysis. The state of the Near East, in the sixth century, for example, certainly suggested the possibility of a religious change. But judging by the available historical evidence, one might have foretold the religious revolt of the eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire and the constitution of a homogeneous Christian Monophysite culture. No one could have foreseen the sudden apparition of Islam and the lightning speed

¹ A paper read at the International Sociological Congress at Geneva in October 1933; a contribution to the discussion of the general topic of Prevision in Sociology.

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with which it swept over the world from the frontiers of India and China to the Atlantic.

In the same way a contemporary observer might have foreseen the development of a new religious unity in the soil of the Roman Empire. He might have envisaged the rise of a philosophic syncretism of the type of Neoplatonism or the spread of an Oriental mystery religion like Mithraism. But he could not have foreseen the birth of Christianity in Palestine or its triumphant progress in the face of the hostility of the secular power and the competition of its rivals or its final acceptance by Constantine and his successors as the official religion of the Roman Empire itself.

It would seem that the possibilities of sociological prevision in regard to religion are even more limited than in other departments of life. Indeed, the word prevision is somewhat misleading, since the most that can be attempted is to study the permanent factors in the religious situation, to determine how far religion exerts a constant influence on social life and what are the forms through which that influence manifests itself. It is true that in the past sociologists have conceived their task in a much more ambitious way. A detailed prevision of the future development of religion was the characteristic feature of the earlier nineteenth-century sociology. Not only did men believe that they had discovered the general sociological laws that governed religious change, they also believed that it was possible to foretell the actual form and content of the religion of the future. This tendency reached its extreme point of development with Comte, who assumed the rôle of a sociological Moses, at once prophet and legislator of the new religious dispensation ; but it was by no means confined to him and to his followers, for there are few sociologists before the time of Pareto, who did not follow the same direction. Thus sociology transgressed its proper limits and aspired to become at once a philosophy of history, a system of ethics, and a non-theological substitute for religion, with the result that the whole subject was brought

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into discredit and sociology became regarded as unscientific and speculative.

The attempt of Comte to abolish metaphysics and theology by absorbing them into sociology was, in fact, even more fatal to sociology than to theology. For in so far as he "sociologized" theology, he "theologized" sociology and thus produced an impure amalgamation of the two which was equally unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the sociologist and of the theologian.

The sociologist cannot study religion fruitfully unless he recognizes that religion is an autonomous activity which has its own independent principles and laws. It is impossible to understand religion simply as a function of society, or to identify the social and the religious categories, as Durkheim attempted to do. It is his business to study religion as a factor in the social process, but this is only one aspect of religion and by no means exhausts its content. The other aspects of religion—the trans-social ones, if I may use the expression—have also to be taken account of, though here the sociologist is incompetent to make final conclusions. Here the sociologist is dependent on the data furnished by theology or the science of religion, which alone can attempt to define the nature and scope of religion comprehensively.

Thus the sociology of religion is a borderland subject which demands the co-operation of two different sciences—two sciences, moreover, which are apt to regard one another with a certain amount of distrust. Nor is this surprising when we consider how widely the two sciences differ in their angle of vision and method of approach. From the theological point of view, religion is essentially concerned with the transcendent and the absolute, with absolute values and eternal truths. But in so far as religion answers to this definition, it has little meaning or value for the sociologist. The figure of Buddha under the bo tree, absorbed in the contemplation of Nirvana, is of the highest interest to the student of religion, but to the sociologist it must appear as the

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apotheosis of the non-sociological aspect of human life. On the other hand, the type of religion that interests the sociologist—that which is entirely bound up with social customs and institutions—is despised by the theologian, who regards it as hardly worthy of the name of religion.

Actually, however, every historic religion contains both elements. Even Confucianism, the most sociological and the least theological of religions, rests on the conception of an absolute principle to which all human action must conform itself, while Buddhism, which seems at first sight to leave no room for the social and the institutional, expresses itself in social institutions like other religions and has a formative influence on culture. Granted that the highest religious act is a going out of the soul from the temporal and the sensible towards the absolute and the eternal, there is a movement in the inverse direction which is equally essential to religion—the movement of return which aims at the consecration of social life and at bringing human action into conformity with the divine order. This second movement takes a different form in every different religion and culture, but it is everywhere present, from the lowest forms of fetishism and animism up to the highest types of atheism. A living religion always aspires to be the centre round which the whole culture revolves, and so that whatever is most vital in social institutions and activities is brought into relation with religions and receives a religious function.

Consequently, in so far as sociological prevision is possible with regard to the organic development of society in general, it will be possible to foresee the social form that religion will tend to acquire in any given culture.

Thus if we take the Geddes-Leplay formula which interprets social life in terms of the mutual interaction of Place, Work, and Folk, we shall find that each of these factors plays a corresponding part in the religious development, so that the sociological form of any given religion can be analysed in terms of these factors. In other words, the sociological form

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of a religion is determined by the way in which it supplies a religious sanction or consecration to Place, to Work, and to the Social Bond itself.

1. In every form of social organization from the totemic group of the Australian aboriginal to the patriarchal family of the Greeks and Romans, and from the barbaric negroid kingdoms of West Africa to the great theocratic monarchies of Egypt and Babylonia and China, we find that the social bond is everywhere *sacred* in the technical religious sense and that social authority rests on religious sanctions. It is here that the possibilities of sociological prevision in regard to religion are to be seen most clearly. For if a society adopts a new form of organization owing to political causes we may expect to find a corresponding change in its religion. But here again the possibilities of prevision are strictly limited. For example, in the ancient world we can see how the passing of the classical civic polity was accompanied by a corresponding decline in the civic religion. And we should expect to find that the transformation of the Roman Empire into an absolute monarchy of a semi-Oriental type would have been accompanied by the introduction of a theocratic state religion like that of the Sassanian monarchy. Now the actual course of events largely fulfils this prevision. We see the appearance in the West of a cult of the solar monarchy under Aurelian and his successors, while the Byzantine Empire has many of the characteristics of a sacred theocratic monarchy. Nevertheless, the development is not complete. For it was not the solar monarchy of Aurelian and Julian that triumphed, but Christianity—a religion which in some respects was actually hostile to the divinization of the monarchy and the imperial state, since it favoured the independence of the spiritual authority and the emancipation of one side of social life from state control.

2. It is, however, by the consecration of work and economic activity that religion enters most profoundly into the sociological process. Nothing determines the form of religion, at

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least in primitive society, so much as the functional activity of the society in question. Each of the primary nature occupations produces its characteristic type of religion : there is a religion of the hunter, a religion of the peasant, and a religion of the pastoralist. Of these the first is characterized by the cult of animal guardian spirits and by the magical rites for the multiplication of game of which we seem to find traces even in paleolithic culture. The second is marked by the worship of the Mother Goddess and by the fertility rites which exist almost universally among the peasant cultures, while the third finds its typical expression in the worship of the Sky god and in the religious practices connected with domestic animals, above all the cow. Nor is this all. Each of these types of religion possesses its own religious ethos and its own spiritual ideal. The religion of the hunter finds its highest expression in the individualistic visionary experience of the Shaman and shows a marked tendency to asceticism. That of the peasant is of a mystical and sacramental character. It finds its centre in a communal act of sacrifice and tends to develop an elaborate system of ritual. Finally the pastoral religion is marked by a high standard of social morality and is accompanied by a more ethical conception of divinity than is to be found among the peasant cultures. These primitive occupational types of religion continue to persist in the higher cultures. Indeed, the development of the higher culture in the Near East seems to be largely based on the higher religious development of the peasant culture. The ritual cycle of the agricultural year becomes the basis of the sacred calendar which holds such an important place in the life of ancient civilization as we see above all in China and in the Maya culture of Central America ; while the development of a priestly class, which is responsible for the correct carrying out of the elaborate ceremonial of the fertility cult, favours the formation of a learned priestly class which played so essential a part in the higher culture of Mesopotamia and Egypt. In the same way the pastoral

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culture, with its virile ethos and its patriarchal organization, provides the basis for the development of the religion and culture of the warrior peoples such as the Aryans, who take a leading part in the development of civilization from the close of the Bronze Age and even earlier.

Moreover, as these social types come into contact and conflict with one another and give rise to new composite forms of social organization, so is it with the corresponding religious types. The most familiar example of this process is to be found in the case of a settled peasant culture that is conquered and dominated by a warrior people. This gives rise not only to a dualism of culture, but to a religious dualism, in which the gods of the conquerors exist side by side with those of the subject population, and each religious tradition influences the other, until the whole society possesses a common religion of composite type. In ancient Greece, for example, we find the old chthonic cults of the Ægean world subsisting alongside of the worship of the Olympian gods until the two are blended in a composite pantheon. Still more remarkable is the interaction between the religion of the warlike pastoral Hebrew tribes and the fertility cults of the conquered Canaanite population, for here the conflict was exceptionally sharp and the "gods of the land" never succeeded in coming to terms with the deity of the immigrants. The religious development of the Jewish people owed its characteristic form to a series of reactions on the part of the religious tradition of the conquerors *against* the process of assimilation which was the normal condition elsewhere. But whether the process of religious change takes the form of co-operation or of conflict, it is conditioned, in the one case as in the other, by the co-existence of two social and religious traditions, so that the existence of this spiritual dualism was just as essential to the monotheistic development of Judaism as it was to the polytheistic syncretism of Greek or Indian religion.

3. The influence of the Place-factor on religious develop-

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ment seems at first sight more external and superficial than that of the two others which we have discussed. Nevertheless, its importance is obvious enough, especially in primitive religion. Even in the lowest type of culture—among the food gatherers, and in the mixed hunting and food-gathering culture of Australia—the Holy Place already holds an important place in the social and religious life of the community, and its importance tends to increase rather than to diminish with the advance of culture. In the archaic civilizations of the Near East, above all in Mesopotamia, the Holy Place develops into the Sacred City and plays a decisive part in the new civic development. Moreover, at this stage of culture, if not earlier, we find the consecration of place extending from the local sanctuary to the whole territory, so that we have not merely a Holy Place, but a Holy Land. In other cases, as in ancient Greece, we find the Holy Place becoming the centre of a federal union or, as in the case of Delphi, the common sanctuary of the Hellenic peoples and exercising a wide influence on colonization and international intercourse. A remarkable example of this kind of development is to be found in West Africa in modern times, where the famous sanctuary of Aro-Chuko in the Cross River district became the centre of an extension network of intertribal commercial relations, among peoples which possessed no common social unity or political organization.

We might expect this factor to lose its significance with the coming of the world religions which no longer deify the powers of nature and which transcend the frontier of country and race. Actually, however, it is not so. Alike in Buddhism, in Islam, and in mediæval Christendom, the Holy Place and the practice of pilgrimage that is associated with it, take a very prominent place and supply an element of social cohesion which might otherwise be lacking.

These three forms of activity—the consecration of place, the consecration of work, and the consecration of the social

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bond itself—are the main channels through which religion finds social expression and acquires a sociological form, and the greater their share in the religious development, the greater is the possibility of sociological prevision. Where religion transcends the categories of Place, Work, Folk, as it does in its most profound manifestations (e.g. in the essential religious experience of the mystic), the rôle of sociological prevision is almost negligible. In other words, the more completely a religion is identified with a particular culture and the more closely the religious and social life of a people is unified, the more room there will be for sociological prevision. But where a religion is divorced from social life, as with a new religion that has not yet achieved social acceptance, or with an old religion that has lost it, the possibilities of prevision are proportionately restricted.

Now this is the situation with regard to our own culture, which has been growing progressively more secular during the last five or six centuries, and which now seems to be without any organic relation to any definite form of religion. In such a case, however, the old channels of socio-religious activity are not entirely closed. They have lost their primary religious character, but they continue to exert a secondary influence of a quasi-religious kind : Place, Work, and Folk are no longer consecrated by being brought into relation with a transcendent religious principle, as in the case of a living religion, but they retain a kind of inherent sacredness which they have acquired from ages of religious association. The transition of social institutions and ideas from the sphere of the sacred to that of the profane is neither instantaneous nor complete. There is an intermediate region of quasi-religious ideas through which a culture in process of secularization must pass. For example, when in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the societies of Western Europe abandoned the old monarchical forms which were consecrated by religious tradition and by the doctrine of divine right, they did not by any means abolish the sacred

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character of the social bond. On the contrary, they transferred all the sacred associations of the past to the new forms of popular sovereignty. The representatives of the old régime, such as Kaunitz or Frederick II, were rationalists who treated politics in a completely secular spirit, while the revolutionaries, from the time of Robespierre to that of Mazzini, were political mystics who regarded the rights of the People as essentially sacred, and who dedicated their lives to the cause of Democracy in a thoroughly religious spirit. And the same too is true of the consecration of work and the consecration of place. The three main substitutes for religion in the modern age, Democracy, Socialism, and Nationalism, which are typical of the age of transition from a religious to a secular society, are each of them based on one of these fundamental factors. Democracy bases its appeal in the sacredness of the People—the consecration of Folk ; socialism on the sacredness of Labour—the consecration of Work ; and Nationalism on the sacredness of the Fatherland—the consecration of Place. These concepts still arouse a genuinely religious emotion, though the emotion has no basis in transcendent religious values or sanctions. It is religious emotion divorced from religious belief. Social activities are no longer consecrated by being brought into relation with the transcendent realities and values which are the proper objects of religion. They are, as it were, consecrated to themselves and elevated into substitutes for the ends to which they were formerly subjected.

This, however, is an anomalous and temporary state of things. It is due to the existence of an inherited social capital of religious feeling, which has been created by objective religious beliefs and by the influence of living historic religions. But if the old religious beliefs disappear and if no new creative religious power arises to take their place, the inherited stock of religious emotion must inevitably become exhausted and the quasi-religious social idealisms of the intermediate type will themselves dis-

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appear like the true social religions of which they are the reflection.

This brings us to the fundamental problem of sociological prevision as applied to religion. How far is it possible to foresee the ultimate culmination of this process of cultural secularization? Is the society that abandons its historic religion capable of persisting indefinitely in a purely secular atmosphere, or is this state of secularization simply the transitional phase through which society passes in its progress from one form of religion to another? Now, there have been many attempts to provide a theory of the civilization-cycle, in all of which the study of religious change has occupied an important place. In recent years we had Herr Spengler's theory, which is universally known, and the less well-known theory of Sir Flinders Petrie, which appeared a few years earlier. And in addition to these theories, which are based on the study of self-contained cultural units, we have the older theories of Vico, St. Simon, Ballanche, and Comte, which involve even wider generalizations, based on universal historical data.

None of these theories is entirely satisfactory from a scientific point of view. Yet they possess common elements which point to the existence of a certain uniformity in cultural development and at least to the possibility of discovering general laws of cultural change. Thus, I believe it is necessary to admit the existence of an organic cultural unity which goes through a process of growth and decay, although the uniformity and regularity of this process have been much exaggerated. This cultural unity is always closely associated with a religious unity to which it owes its inner cohesion and form. In some cases, indeed, it is hardly possible to differentiate the two, as with Islam, which is at once a culture and a religion, and in which the culture can hardly be conceived of as existing apart from the religion. Consequently a society that loses its religion loses at the same time its principle of inner cohesion, and it seems justifiable to suppose

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in normal cases that the loss of the historic religion of a society is a sign that it is undergoing a process of social dissolution. The process is a slow one, for, as we have seen, a religion may be replaced by a quasi-religious form of idealism which temporarily fulfils the sociological function of a genuine religion. Moreover, we must distinguish between a society that becomes partially secularized by the extension of its activities without losing its religious form, and the genuine secularization which destroys the religious form itself. We cannot, however, assume the possibility of a culture continuing to preserve its unity and to persist indefinitely without any religious form whatsoever. When the process of secularization is completed, the process of social dissolution is consummated and the culture comes to an end.

If this is so, a culture like our own, which is approaching the final stage of secularization, is faced with two alternatives :

A. The complete secularization of Western culture may be followed by its gradual dissolution and by the reassertion of the traditional religion-cultures of Asia which have been temporarily overshadowed by the European world-hegemony. The modern European predominance has a certain resemblance to that of Rome in the ancient world. It is based on a true culture, but it is also an imperialism which owes its extension to its superiority in military science and in mechanical organization. Hence its material development is disproportionate to its vital human resources, and the external uniformity that it is able to impress on the subject peoples veils a real diversity of culture. The weakening or dissolution of the original social nucleus on which the imperial organization is built is at once followed by the reassertion of submerged cultural traditions which seemed to have disappeared, but which were in reality only dormant. In this way a very rapid transformation of the whole cultural situation may take place without the inter-

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vention of any positively new factors. The plaster façade of civilization has crumbled and revealed the diversities of the structure behind.

B. On the other hand, it is possible that the process of secularization may be checked or reversed either by the coming of a new religion or by a revival of the old religion with which the culture was formerly associated. This latter alternative is usually regarded as incompatible with the law of progress which so many sociological theorists have taken for granted. It is, however, by no means impossible, as we see, for example, from the history of China, which owed its apparent stability to a series of deliberate revivals of the Confucian tradition.

A development of this kind is hardly to be expected in the case of so untraditional a civilization as that of Western Europe. On the other hand, the historic religion of Europe—Christianity—has shown itself to be peculiarly adaptable to different cultural situations. Nothing could be more dissimilar than the Byzantine culture of the ninth century and the Baroque culture of the seventeenth. Both, however, were Christian cultures, and though their religion expressed itself in very different social and æsthetic forms there can be no question of its theological identity. Consequently we cannot rule out the possibility of Christianity finding further social expression in some future development of the European cultural tradition.

Nothing, however, is more difficult for the sociologist to foresee than the particular form of religion which will dominate the mind of society, for in these matters his judgment is likely to be affected by his private religious and philosophic beliefs. The sociologist is apt to judge religious issues not merely as a sociologist, but as a theologian—and an amateur theologian at that, in the same way that the theologian who writes on social subjects is tempted to construct an amateur sociology. And as a rule the sociologist is peculiarly ill-fitted to pronounce on theological matters,

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since the natural bias of his own studies tends to make him emphasize those aspects of religion which are secondary and unessential from the purely religious point of view. It is necessary to remember that the successful type of religion is not that which commends itself to the politician, or the sociologist or the philosopher, but that which appeals to the religious man. For example, in eighteenth-century England, Deism, the religion which seemed to conform itself to the mentality of the age, was from the religious point of view a complete failure, and proved unable to compete successfully with the Wesleyan revival, a movement which made no appeal except to the purely religious consciousness. Thus the decisive question for the sociologist to consider will be not what type of religion is most capable of coming to terms with the secular elements in our culture, with modern secular thought, or even with modern science, but rather what is the type of religion which is strongest on its own ground, which makes the greatest appeal to the religious consciousness and possesses the most authentically religious character. Thus the sociologist of nineteen centuries ago would have had to direct his attention not to the obvious phenomenon of the Augustan revival, with its official propaganda and its admirable literary expression, nor to the fashionable religious philosophy of Stoicism, but to the obscure religious movements that were taking place among the populace in the Oriental provinces of the Empire. Such awareness is, of course, inconceivable in the circumstances of that age, but we may well doubt if it would be possible even to-day, and this example may afford some measure of the extent of the task that lies before sociology in the religious field.

SOCIAL CLASS—A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

By T. H. MARSHALL

IT is a bad thing for a subject when few people write on it at length but many in brief. That is why the study of Social Class is in so unhealthy a state. Every attempt at a general systematic Sociology must contain a chapter on it, and the learned journals of Europe and America are sprinkled with articles disputing its essential nature, arguing over its definition or even denying its existence, yet recent years have produced only one substantial work which attempts a comprehensive view, that of Pontus Fahlbeck.¹ Meanwhile studies have been made by historians and sociologists both of particular forms of Class, such as Slavery, Caste or the Proletariat, and of the Class structure of particular societies.² It can easily be argued that this is the proper line of attack, and that these researches should be allowed to progress further before any attempt at synthesis or at general analysis is made. But there are two objections to this view. In the first place, much labour may be wasted if the researchers do not start with a fairly clear idea of the questions to which they are trying to find answers, and, unfortunately, the minor spate of literary fragments on the subject has succeeded in obscuring, rather than clarifying, the issue. In the second place, there is a grave danger of treating Class in isolation from other social institutions, or even of treating a particular form of Class apart from the Class structure of the society as a whole. Some writers, studying social evolution, describe the addition of Class to Class in a manner which implies that the arrival of the new left the character and

¹ P. Fahlbeck, *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft*. There is also a short study by G. Albrecht, *Die sozialen Klassen*. P. Sorokin's *Social Mobility* rejects the concept of Class as unhelpful.

² A good example of the latter type of study is Th. Geiger, *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*.

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personality of the old unchanged.¹ The Class theory of Marx is based on a thoroughly comprehensive view of the social process, but this did not prevent Engels from tracing the life-history of the Bourgeoisie from the feudal to the capitalist age, during which time it changed its personnel, its whole character, and its place in the social hierarchy, but, apparently, succeeded in preserving its identification disk intact for the benefit of future historians.²

This is my justification for attempting yet another analysis of the concept, Social Class. But, at the very outset, we meet a serious difficulty. If we start with a word—Class—we have already made important assumptions. We are assuming that, because the word is commonly and usefully employed, it must express a definable concept. We may proceed to review all the objects which it generally denotes and to identify the concept by observing their common characteristics. We may then exercise our ingenuity in composing a definition that covers all known varieties, and, in fact, behave exactly like an International Conference achieving unanimity through a formula. This process, when thus crudely described, appears obviously futile. But it is not easy to shake oneself entirely free from the tyranny of words. We can trace it in the work of Robert Michels, who spends much time in a vain search for a satisfactory criterion, and rejects them all,³ and also in that of Paul Mombert, who insists on a comprehensive definition and consequently stresses unimportant similarities at the expense of important differences.⁴ A definition of this kind has little heuristic value, since it excludes nothing that is comparable with what it includes. The alternative is to start at the other end, the factual end, using the word, Class, merely as a finger-post indicating the general direction of our researches, and to classify the relevant

¹ Cf. Th. Geiger, *Zur Theorie des Klassenbegriffs* (Schmoller's *Jahrbuch*, vol. 54), p. 390, where he criticizes Vierkandt for falling into this error. Also L. Gumplowicz, *Grundriss der Soziologie*, ch. 3, § 2.

² *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*: Introduction.

³ *Beitrag zur Lehre von der Klassenbildung* (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. xlix).

⁴ *Zum Wesen der sozialen Klasse* (*Hauptprobleme der Soziologie*), especially p. 244.

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observed phenomena on the basis of the similarities and differences which are significant for social analysis, without caring whether the resulting concepts are or are not possessed of names. If names do not exist, we can invent them. If this is our method, we can legitimately begin with the study of any one society that seems suitable, and we shall not thereby become guilty of the sin of which Mombert accuses Sombart, that of defining the general concept, Class, by means of evidence taken from one instance only. The universality of the phenomena described remains an open question until tested by comparison. Nevertheless, the analysis of the particular example may yield results capable of general application, provided it is interpreted, not merely in terms of external form, but with reference to fundamental social functions and social relations.

Let us take, then, as our finger-post, not merely "Class," but "Social Class," and as our instance, contemporary England. The investigator who chooses his own society as his field of research is able to use the knowledge he can derive from intuition and observation as a guide in his analysis. Social Class is a phenomenon of which he has direct personal experience as a force in his own life. He can say, with certainty, what it is not. He can frame a working hypothesis of what it is. That is the purpose of this article. It may not be necessary to mention contemporary England again, but the whole analysis will be made in the light of my knowledge of the society in which I live. My object is to describe a fact, not to define a word, but to describe it by resolving it into simple concepts, into fundamental social principles, which can serve as tools for wider research operations. When I speak of Social Class in this article, it is to be understood in this restricted sense.

II

It is important to realize what a large variety of groups must be excluded before we arrive at even the broadest conception

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of Class. It is not merely that we exclude natural or statistical groups which have no social significance, and also kinship groups, local communities, and religious and political organizations.¹ We do not include such highly significant classes as married women, lunatics, Old Age Pensioners, and motorists. Yet it is not easy to explain why they should be left out if occupational groups are to be put into the list merely because they are conspicuous social aggregations. Othmar Spann conspicuously fails to answer this question, and his article on *Klasse und Stand*² is really an article on such social groups as happen to have taken his fancy. The method of cataloguing the various foundations on which such groups may be built—as property, occupation, political power, etc.—is bound to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and there remains a vague and undefined residue which contains precisely that form of grouping which, led by the finger-post “Social Class,” we are looking for in contemporary England.

What, then, are the qualities which we know to belong to this phenomenon that we wish to describe and analyse? First, it represents a hierarchical social stratification. It is concerned with vertical, not horizontal, social distance. Occupational groups—the German *Berufsstände*—which may stand two or three or many on a level, must be excluded. They are of great social importance and they may play a part in the formation of Social Class, but in themselves they are something different. Secondly, the hierarchy, the relationship of inferiority and superiority, is not based merely on natural differences. It requires social recognition. The natural superiority of the leader over the follower is not of the nature of Social Class. The respect of the lower for the higher is direct and spontaneous (though related to social function), not induced and conventional. Thirdly, there is some permanence in the grouping, so that a man who belongs

¹ Cf. Schmoller's definition, which begins with a list of excluded groups. *Die soziale Frage*, p. 142.

² *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft*.

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to a certain Class remains in it unless—to use a colloquialism—“something is done about it,” in contrast to age-groups, between which mobility is automatic.

The implications of these last two points need to be further examined. Point three does not follow logically from point two ; it is a separate observation. Society could—and some societies do—recognize age as the basis of a hierarchy. But in our society Social Class is conceived as having stability. This is essential to it, and differentiates it radically from a system of seniority. We must, therefore, ask what, exactly, social recognition means. Is it merely a formal acknowledgment of a pre-existent fact, like the hall-mark on gold, or the bestowal at will of a new character, like the stamp on the guinea? And, if it is the former, are these facts, these insignia of Social Class, attributes which an individual has normally a reasonable chance of acquiring by his own effort? It is clear that society is not even as free to bestow class status as a monarch is to bestow rank and titles, although the monarch is by custom expected to pay heed to the pre-existent fact of merit. The vast majority of individuals class themselves by virtue of the possession of certain attributes. But even so, recognition is not merely a hall-mark. Society does not recognize a bourgeois in the sense in which an entomologist recognizes a beetle or a violin expert a Stradivarius. Recognition implies the admission to certain social relationships, and therefore, to use Max Weber's peculiar term, the offer of a certain “Lebenschance.”¹ We must not interpret this, as he does, in a purely economic sense as describing the individual's position in relation to the market. It is equally applicable to social opportunity. Social Class, as distinct from technical or financial endowments, can influence a man's economic Lebenschance. It may affect his selection for certain kinds of employment. A landlord may reject a perfectly solvent tenant as undesirable on the grounds of his Class, which he regards as an index of his

¹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Part III, ch. 4.

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probable behaviour. But it is also far more generally operative in determining the possibilities of social intercourse that lie open to him, marriage, social mixing and the admission to associations of all kinds. I submit, therefore, that, if we are thinking of a Social Class as a group based on a certain resemblance of its members, we must regard it as a group of persons with similar social chances, rather than as a group of persons with similar internal or external attributes. The essence of Social Class is the way a man is treated by his fellows (and, reciprocally, the way he treats them), not the qualities or the possessions which cause that treatment. It would be possible, and perhaps useful, to group people simply in terms of their attributes, without asking how those attributes affected their social relations, but the result would be a study of social types, not of Social Classes.

Social recognition is, therefore, an important factor even though, in the great majority of cases, a man's Social Class is indubitably determined by the circumstances of his life. These may be divided into the experience, environment, and education which have moulded his character and habits during childhood and youth, on the one hand, and the external assets and the skill and knowledge which he may acquire later in life by his own deliberate effort, on the other hand. It is on the former, relatively unalterable, qualities that Social Class is conceived to be based, but the latter have their share of influence. They may claim, though not command, recognition. Wealth, for example, sometimes secures direct admission into the upper ranks of society on its own account. More often it is allowed to count as a compensation for deficiencies in the intrinsic personal qualities normally belonging to the members of the Class. But the main service of wealth is to purchase the environment which, given time enough, will produce the intrinsic qualities. This fact further increases the importance of social recognition, which can determine how much weight is to be given to those

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insignia of Class which can be most easily obtained or most plausibly imitated.

This view implies the rejection of the purely objective theories which represent Class as automatically determined by definite criteria, especially wealth and occupation, and also the purely subjective theories according to which a man belongs to the Class that he feels he belongs to, whose class-consciousness he shares.¹ The adherents of the latter theory are inclined to say that a man can enter a Class by adopting the views that are characteristic of it and by becoming a supporter of its interests. They would agree, therefore, with Ferdinand Tönnies that the Ideal Type of the Class is the Party,² and with Theodor Geiger that the Proletariat includes sympathetic socialist intellectuals.³ I have suggested that the objectivity of Class consists, not in the criteria that distinguish it, but in the social relations that it produces, and its subjectivity in the basic need for mutual conscious recognition.

III

The next proposition is, again, not an inference from any premise, but the fruit of observation. There are many principles on which a society may be divided into groups. There are several on which it may be stratified into layers. But Social Class is a single principle which can only produce one result. It permeates the whole community, so that its application yields a single scheme of location which, in theory, assigns a place to every component part of the whole. It may appear as though clearly defined Class groups exist only at the top and bottom of society, and not in the middle. But we know that Social Class enters into the life of every member of the community, because our society is possessed of a Class system. It recognizes this form of differentiation as a force affecting social behaviour and social opportunity. It is true that this

¹ For a classification of theories on this basis, see Mombert, *op. cit.*

² Article, "Stände und Klassen," in *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*.

³ *Zur Theorie*, etc., pp. 421 et seq.

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proposition, especially when applied to other societies than our own, produces untidy results, but that is not a sufficient reason for abandoning it. It is difficult, for instance, to say that the Classes of peasant-proprietor and urban bourgeois can be fitted into a single social scale, one above the other, although it is clear that they belong to the same principle of classification. The answer is that they are the results of applying the same principle to different communities. There is a federal character in organized society: within the major community minor communities exist. The more heterogeneous the major community, the more unlikely it is to have a simple Class structure. In such a case we may say that there is a national Class system, in the sense, only, that Class is a feature of the lives of all nationals, but that there are no national Classes. To add to the confusion, it is quite possible that there may be *one* national Class, an aristocracy, the only group that has achieved national unity, but it will be the product of a Class system that permeates the whole. There is nothing disturbing in this thought, and we must not try to impose on our subject a clarity and symmetry which it does not by nature possess.

Other important conclusions follow from this conception of Social Class as a stratification of a community. We may recall the sense in which Professor McIver uses this term. "The mark of a community," he writes, "is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relations *may* be found within it."¹ This rightly emphasizes the fact that a community is concerned with human activities regarded not merely as means, but as the ends of life. It is obvious that the same activity frequently, or even normally, figures in both categories, but the two aspects lead to different mental orientations and to different social patterns. Many cultural associations exist for the pursuit of special ends, but a community pursues them all. Social Class, as a section of a community, retains this essential character. One or two

¹ *Society, its Structure and Changes*, p. 10.

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illustrations will make this point clear. In all societies Social Class is concerned with the selection of occupations, that is, with economic means, but the connexion is derived from a conventional view of the proper way for a man of given station to "occupy himself." The occupation is here being considered as an end, as a part of the whole pattern of human living. If we look back to the time when gentlemen were not supposed to engage in trade, we can see that this was not because trade was an inadequate means for procuring the income required to support a gentleman's life, but because trade itself was thought incompatible with the ideal of what a gentleman's life should be.

If Social Class is concerned with *all* ends, it follows that it must be bi-sexual, since a complete community life of men or women only is inconceivable. Observation confirms this inference. A group of men endowed with rank or titles for which only men are eligible may play an important part in the formation of Classes, but it is not a Social Class. For our purposes the significant group created by the English Peerage is not composed of the men who sit in the House of Lords, but includes their families and relatives of both sexes through several degrees of affinity. The "professional Class" is not co-terminous with the members of the professions. Wherever women take their social position from their fathers and husbands, Social Class is effectively determined by the status of men, but it is not composed of men. We cannot accept the familiar generalization that Class tends to endogamy and also speak, in a literal sense, of a military Class, since there are obvious difficulties in the way of making an army endogamous.

This can be expressed by saying that the true unit of Social Class is the family. This has been said by Joseph Schumpeter, but he does not build on the statement and seems later actually to abandon it.¹ He appears to be thinking of the

¹ *Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu* (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. lvii), p. 12. But cf. p. 29.

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important fact that, however mobile the society, every child is classed at birth by the circumstances of its birth. This confirms the rejection both of the purely subjective view of Class and of the objective view which relates it directly to the intrinsic qualities of the individual. The new-born infant is not class-conscious and is, socially speaking, intrinsically nothing, and yet there is no doubt that it belongs to a Class and that this fact determines its "Lebenschance." But it is more important, because less easy, to remember that Social Class reproduces the quality of the family as a form of association for the satisfaction of non-specialized social ends.

IV

It is sometimes said that the force which unites a Social Class is "consciousness of kind." Giddings used this phrase with a precise, but quite different, meaning.¹ If we abandon his interpretation, the whole emphasis is thrown on the word "kind," and we are offering a synonym, not a definition. "Kind" is simply that particular sort of similarity which builds Social Classes and not Trade Unions, Literary Societies, Political Parties or County Associations. We must try to do better than this.

Social ties may be classified as being based either on difference or similarity. Difference unites by creating the possibility of reciprocal service. Similarity unites most obviously through the recognition of a common interest, and less obviously as representing the easiest antithesis to isolation. Difference most readily suggests pairs, such as husband and wife, doctor and patient, master and pupil. Similarity suggests groups, such as nationalities, occupational associations or primitive age groups. The reciprocal pair may be enlarged by introducing other co-operating differences, as by adding the child to husband and wife or the nurse to doctor and patient. If we merely multiply both sides of a reciprocal pair we get two reciprocal groups of similars, or

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 17 and 124-131.

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identity groups, as we may briefly term them, as when master and pupil are enlarged to become staff and students. The existence of a reciprocal pair usually implies a basic, element of identity. Marriage is a union of different sexes but is normally built on similarities of race and culture. The reciprocal pair takes shape within a wider identity group. And yet, how slender this basis may be is seen if we consider how closely the relation of doctor to patient resembles that of horse-leech to horse.

This brings out the two functions of the identity group. It may be the necessary background for the formation of reciprocal ties, or it may be one half of a multiple reciprocal pair. If we consider, for example, a typical London Club, it is clear that the members are united by their identity of sex, Class and general culture, and yet, if they were identical in all respects, it would be a very dull affair. The purpose of the Club is not simply to satisfy a desire to move among reproductions of oneself (though such a desire exists), but to exploit those minor personal differences of character, taste, and opinions which are found within the otherwise homogeneous milieu. The Club is thus self-contained so far as its purpose is concerned, and is not organized with a view to co-operation or competition with bodies outside itself. The Trade Union, on the other hand, though it utilizes differences of ability in its members for organization and leadership, is, as an organ of collective bargaining, a body in which members become as undifferentiated as the units in a mathematical calculation and the whole energy of the group is focused on its own reciprocal relationship with another group outside.

Now clearly any sense of similarity within a group implies a consciousness of difference from those not of the group. This is, in the case of the Club, a matter of comparison, but, in the case of the Trade Union, a matter of relational contacts. Of these two types of group, the identity group utilizing subsidiary differences for mutual advantage and conscious of its identity through comparison with those out-

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side, and the identity group organized for reciprocal relational contacts with one or more other groups, Social Class belongs to the former. It does, however, frequently develop the characteristics of the latter in addition. But a group of type two, which lacks the characteristics of type one, is not a Social Class. A working-class, which is a real sphere of social intercourse of all kinds, may become so conscious of its antagonism to capital as to qualify for inclusion under type two. But it remains a Social Class. A working-class organization, possibly composed of men only, which is occupied entirely with the defence of its interests against capital, belongs rather to the category of party. This distinction might be translated into the terms used by McIver and others by saying that Social Class is based rather on similarity of attitudes than on identity of interests.

It follows from everything that has been said so far that Social Class is a derivative of the whole social personality of the individual, not of a mere facet of it, such as some technical equipment and the interests it may create. Social Class is a human aggregation which has not been submitted to that splitting of individuality into its associative elements so subtly analysed by Simmel.¹ Each member mirrors in the microcosm of his personality the many-featured image of his Class. Loyalty to Class is, in a peculiar sense, loyalty to self. Class-consciousness is akin to consciousness of nationality, and nationality is not a specialism, not, like a profession or an income or a belief, detachable in thought from the whole personality. And yet Class is alterable. Movement within one generation is not impossible: movement within two is common. Class-consciousness may, therefore, be combined with an ambition to rise, or to enable one's children to rise. This has led to the assertion that *disloyalty* is a characteristic feature of Social Classes.² This is a misleading generalization. The distinctive characteristic is

¹ *Soziologie*, ch. 6.

² W. Sulzbach, *Die "Klasse" und der Klassenkampf*. (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. lxiii), pp. 305-6.

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rather the markedly egoistic quality of class-consciousness. An individual's behaviour is conditioned by his Class, but he does not behave as a representative of it and he does not betray it by aspiring to leave it.

This word "representative" may lead to confusion, since it has two meanings. We say a man is "representative of his group" when we mean he is typical of it. But when we say he is "a representative of his group," we mean that he is fulfilling a function with regard to it which involves a submission of his individuality to a cause. In the former case he is merely himself, but it is a self that can easily be matched. In the second case he is something besides himself, and also something less than himself. When two foreigners meet in peaceful conversation, their attitudes are greatly affected by their different nationalities, and this is a difference of which they are both conscious. And yet the relationship is entirely personal, the nationality expressing itself through the individual it has created. They meet as the products, not as the representatives, of their environing social groups. But when two enemy foreigners meet in time of war, each sees within and behind the man who confronts him the image of the group which he represents. It is a meeting of two conflicting interests, two fragments of personalities, two points on the perimeters of two vastly greater wholes. Social Classes may also be at war, in thought or in deed, and the same result ensues. But the foundation of Social Class, discernible beneath such conscious antagonism and often existing without it, is the fact of "representativeness" in the wider, less specialized sense.

V

Many writers try to elucidate the nature of Classes by assigning certain attributes to each. The Middle Classes are Puritanical, the Capitalists are acquisitive, the Peasants are conservative, and so forth.¹ Such phrases do not give us a

¹ E.g. Arthur Bauer, *Les classes sociales*, which is a very naïve example of this method.

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definition. They do not mean that, in a strict logical sense, Middle Class connotes Puritanism and Peasantry Conservatism. There is no intention of maintaining that, if a man is not conservative, he cannot be a peasant. All that this process amounts to is a vague indication of the characteristics one may expect to find widely present within a group, the existence and general boundaries of which have been assumed as determined by other criteria. Those who correlate each Class, not with abstract qualities, but with external facts like income or occupation, generally use these concepts in the same vague way. When they are used with precision—as they can be—as the connotations of the Class name, the result is the identification of groups which may be of great social importance, but which are not identical with the phenomenon of Social Class as understood in this paper.¹

Now, if such phrases as “peasants are conservative” and “Englishmen love games” do not indicate connotations, what do they mean? They may be a loose way of saying that these are attributes of a majority of the group. But to say that “Englishmen love games” because a majority are sportsmen is only one degree less foolish than to say “Englishmen are women” because a majority of the population is female. Sociology is not interested in proportions, but in relationships and the behaviour that results from them. But the words may be intended to suggest a different idea; they may mean that the love of games is sufficiently prevalent in England to leave its mark on the customary and institutional behaviour of the society. It affects not only the game-lovers but also the unsporting. It is part of a social environment with which they all come into contact. In this case we are not making a qualitative judgment of every individual and then a quantitative assessment of the results, but we are making a single qualitative judgment of the society. It is

¹ This is clearly recognized by Mombert in his article, “Die Tatsachen der Klassenbildung” (Schmoller's *Jahrbuch*, vol. xlv), in which he attempts a statistical study of mobility.

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a judgment which can be tested and given precision by a more detailed examination of the ways in which this partiality for sport affects the general pattern of social behaviour. In this way our attention is diverted from the concept of a group of persons who resemble one another in their love of games to the concept of the pursuit of games as a force operating throughout the society. The group may be a reality, but it is not the whole reality, and its frontiers are indeterminate.

An illustration nearer to our theme can be found in the social significance of age. In some societies age is made the basis of a hierarchy of groups with social functions and specific relations to one another, which influence the behaviour of the individual members. In our society there is no such system of groups, and yet age is a fact to which some social meaning is attached, so that it affects social precedence, rights to property, claims to promotion, and many other things. At every level there is a large, but indeterminate, number of persons who are conscious of their resemblance in this respect and are thereby drawn together—or would be, if they met—into something in the nature of an age-group. But such groups are only incidental. At certain selected levels much sharper lines are drawn, creating such groups as infants, adults, and pensioners. But such groups tell only a part of the story. The same principle, age, which creates them also operates *within* them to produce subtler stratifications. So it is with Social Class. There is a customary standard of superiority and inferiority which operates throughout the community, contributing to determine for every individual his relations with other individuals and his access to social and economic opportunity. At every level there is a number of persons who recognize—or would, if they met—their objective similarities. These may be regarded as constituting a group, but it is easy to exaggerate the importance of such a concept. In the first place, the membership is fluctuating and indeterminate, and it is

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doubtful whether it can even theoretically be ascertained. In the second place, since Social Class implies a consciousness of a position with reference to other persons, a consciousness of social distance, no group is really helpful for its elucidation unless it is composed of persons in whom this consciousness takes the form of the recognition of membership of the group. Such a group would have a quasi-associational character which is not necessarily present in a Social Class. To return to the analogy, I know that there are others of the same age as myself, who might be regarded as a group, and I recognize them when we meet and my behaviour is affected by the fact, but my consciousness of age as a factor in social behaviour does not take the form of a feeling of group-membership. It is a personal consciousness which guides my behaviour in each situation, in each relationship, as it arises. The existence of the group is inferred, rather than felt. Undoubtedly any consciousness of Class has more sense of the group in it than this, but this sense is probably strongest with regard to the division of society into three or four main strata, the Upper Class, the Upper Middle, Lower Middle, and Lower Classes. And the identification of these as groups cannot tell the whole story, since the same principle of Class which creates them also operates within them to produce subtler differentiations.

To sum up : it may be impossible in our society to discover any definable groups which can be called Social Classes and which do not intermingle and overlap. It does not follow that Class is a declining or an insignificant factor in our social life. The selection of the most obvious objective criteria may show us only potential, and not actual social groups. It does not follow that Class is only a potential force. Professor Sorokin dismisses Class as a sociologists' myth. Others declare that only one true Class exists to-day, the Proletariat. Von Wiese calls to his aid his curious concept of the "abstract crowd" (*die abstrakte Masse*), a group that is not yet a group but which contains potentialities of common

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action.¹ I prefer to stress the institutional character of Class as against the associational character of Classes and to think in terms of a force rather than of groups. It is institutional in the sense that it is a social principle which presses individual behaviour into socially-determined moulds and produces uniformities of conduct in those who conform to custom. This view may involve only a difference of emphasis, but it has the value of guarding us against an under-estimate of the importance of this force of Class in a society which possesses no definable Classes and of preventing much useless labour and many futile squabbles on the part of those who persist in the attempt to find the true insignia of these social groups.²

VI

It remains to examine very briefly the relation between the concept of Social Class outlined here and the Class theory of Karl Marx. For Marx Class is the principal dynamic force in the process of social change. It arises from the relations which are inherent in the productive system. These relations vary through time and are also numerous in any one period. Marx recognized several Classes in nineteenth-century Europe, in particular the landowners, the greater bourgeoisie, the lesser bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the slum proletariat.³ Progress, according to the Marxian dialectic, is revolutionary. Each system moves towards a qualitative perfection and at the same time produces its own negation which brings about an abrupt qualitative change into something new and different. In its perfect state it is

¹ Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, p. 18; Sulzbach, *loc. cit.* p. 299; L. D. Pesl, *Mittelstandsfragen* (*Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Part IX, vol. i); Carr Saunders and Caradog Jones, *Social Structure of England and Wales*, ch. 6; von Wiese, *System der allgemeinen Soziologie*, Part III, chapters 2 and 6.

² G. L. Duprat, *Soziale Typen oder soziale Klassen?* (*Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, vol. i), puts forward a theory somewhat similar to this, but he is more uncompromising in his denial of the existence of Classes as groups.

³ *Capital*, vol. iii, ch. 52, gives three Classes. There are longer lists in *The Communist Manifesto*, and in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (trans. E. and C. Paul), pp. 32 and 44.

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dominated by one relationship,¹ that between the ruling Class, which impresses its ideology on the whole society, and the subject Class which it requires as an instrument to its ends, but which will ultimately overthrow it. These alone are the "revolutionary" Classes.² This is the nature of that clear-cut social dichotomy towards which capitalist society was asserted to be advancing. When the revolutionary crisis occurs, it springs from the conscious antagonism of two groups of a quasi-associational character.

Now it is clear that the essential factor in this theory is the conception of these production-relations as forces determining the life-situation of individuals. Since many people are involved in similar relationships, they produce recognizable groups, but these are at first only of a statistical nature. Capital creates a mass of people in a common situation, and "this mass is already a class, as opposed to capital, but not yet for itself." In the struggle the mass unites "to form a class and therewith to form a party,"³ but it only acquires this reality as a group when it has ceased to correspond to the relationship which created it. The Proletariat is distinguished by an attitude, a policy, an ideology, which may be rejected by some wage-earners and adopted by some members of the bourgeoisie.⁴ The final social dichotomy does not imply that everyone is either a capitalist or a wage-earner, but that the relation between these two functional groups has so decisive an influence on the economic life of the whole society that everyone, even though not directly involved, is compelled to take up an attitude with regard to it

¹ "Under all forms of society there is a certain industry which predominates over all the rest and whose condition therefore determines the rank and influence of all the rest. It is the universal light with which all the other colours are tinged and are modified through its peculiarity." *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (trans. N. I. Stone), p. 302. Compare the very similar approach of Sombart. A Class "is a social group, the individuals of which are the representatives of some economic system." *Socialism and the Social Movement*, pp. 1-2.

² *The Communist Manifesto* (ed. Ryazanoff), p. 26 ; cf. Marx's severe criticism of the Gotha Programme for its failure to realize the revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie.

³ *The Poverty of Philosophy* (trans. Quelch), p. 158 ; *Communist Manifesto*, p. 37.

⁴ Cf. *Communist Manifesto*, p. 38.

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and to assimilate himself to a Class to which, by objective criteria, he does not belong.¹ It is not surprising, therefore, that when at last Marx attempted to define his Classes and enumerate their insignia, he began hopelessly to flounder. The chapter in which Engels incorporated his notes was never finished, but there is enough to show that he was heading for disaster and that he was not perturbed. It mattered little that he could not define his groups or even prove their existence: he had no doubt at all about the reality of his social forces. Even in England the stratification was not found in its pure form, "however, this is immaterial for our analysis."²

In this respect, then, there is a resemblance between the method of Marx and the method I have attempted to follow above, but the subject-matter differs. It is not enough to say that Marx's Classes are economic and mine social, his concerned with production and mine mainly with consumption, his with activities regarded as means and mine with activities regarded as ends, though all these judgments contain some element of truth. Nor would the distinction between them be rendered unimportant if we were to agree with what Marx would undoubtedly maintain, that my Classes are a mere insignificant by-product of his. They would not thereby become unworthy of analysis. And, in fact, there is a very important qualitative difference between them. Adopting the terminology suggested above, we can say that my Social Classes are identity groups existing for the sake of the internal contacts which the identity makes possible. Marx's Classes are identity groups representing the two members of a reciprocal pair and using the identity as a means for influencing the relationship that makes the pair.

¹ Cf. John R. Commons, *Is Class Conflict in America growing and is it Inevitable?* (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xiii, p. 756). He estimates that more than two-thirds of the occupied males in the U.S.A. are "spectators" in the Class struggle, but the importance of the conflict cannot be measured by the numbers involved.

² *Capital*, vol. iii, ch. 52; cf. Cooley's judgment on Classes in America. "A conflict of class interests is, in great degree, not a conflict of persons but rather one of ideas in a common social medium." *Social Organization*, p. 242.

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His Classes are marked by the overwhelming importance of external contacts which are, in fact, the sole cause of their existence. Mine are marked by the relative absence of such contacts and the relative self-sufficiency of the group for its own purposes. The borderline between my Classes is defined by an attitude of comparison which recognizes qualitative differences. The borderline between his Classes is defined in terms of functional interaction.

It is tempting to seek analogies between this distinction and that between the German concepts of *Stand* and *Klasse*, usually translated as Estate and Class. Werner Sombart speaks of Estates as organically related, Classes as mechanically related. The Estate regards itself as a member of a greater whole whose interests it serves. A Class is, with regard to the whole society, self-seeking, disruptive, annihilating, pursuing its own interests without respect to other groups.¹ Others put it that Estates co-operate and Classes conflict, and that when an Estate manifests open social antagonism, it becomes a Class. Slavery is an Estate until the slaves rebel.² Such a classification appears to me invalid, and it obscures the really significant differences between the types of group viewed in this particular aspect of their functional relationship. Three concepts can be distinguished. There is first the functional group which is self-sufficient for the performance of its own function and is placed thereby in a definite relationship, not with any one other group, but with the whole community. They are exemplified in the old German jingle, *Lehr-, Wehr- and Nährstände*, in many legends, such as those found in Scandinavia and Persia, which represent these groups as natural creations with physical differences,³ and find a close parallel in modern society in the

¹ *Moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. ii, pt. 2, pp. 1091-3.

² Tönnies, *loc. cit.* K. Bauer-Mengelberg, *Stand und Klasse* (*Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, vol. iii). The latter maintains that an Estate War is possible if the conflict is not over the place of each combatant in the social organism, but over the nature of the social organism itself.

³ Cf. Sombart, *Moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. ii, pt. 2, p. 1092. "Sie verdanken ihre Entstehung einem natürlichen Schöpfungsvorgang."

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professions, though these have a more definitely associational character. Together they make up a pattern of social co-operation, and the question whether the terms of co-operation are acceptable to all members is a secondary one. Secondly, there are the functional groups which exist only by virtue of their functional interaction with another group. It is through this relationship that their productive function is performed. Each relationship creates a pair, and no pair is collectively equal to the whole community. These are Classes in the Marxian sense, and I would include, not only capital and labour, landlord and tenant, but also, in spite of the assertion of Mises¹ that this is not a production relationship, lord and serf. One group may combine both characters, as was clearly the case in the medieval conception of a servile Class. It is probable that an analysis of attitudes during the General Strike would reveal a similar combination of ideas. The relation of capital to labour is of such universal importance that it easily became confused with the relation of labour as a functional Estate to the community as a whole. The strikers, therefore, found it difficult to believe that anyone could honestly hold that the community existed as a third party. Finally, there are the Social Classes which I have been discussing which are not based on functional relationships at all. Anyone who reads Sombart's little essay, *Das Proletariat*, can see at once that he is there concerned with this third aspect of the Class, and not with the functional aspect which is the main theme of his larger works. The investigation of this aspect also reveals further stratifications within the wage-earning Class, which, under the Marxian analysis, appears as a homogeneous unit. In the case of the bourgeoisie it not only reveals a similar subdivision, but also suggests that what unity the bourgeoisie possesses as a Social Class is not derived directly from the relation of capital to labour. Capitalists, in the sense of owners of property, do show common features when examined

¹ *Die Gemeinwirtschaft*, pp. 322-4.

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in terms of Social Class, but these are not derived from the fact that capital gives power over labour, nor primarily from the fact that capital yields an income, but rather from the fact that property, however small, gives security and insurance against misfortune and liberty for new adventure, thus cultivating a sense of proprietorship in a civilization, of independence of status, which makes governments appear as servants, not as masters, and institutions as the means to freedom, not to servitude.

I offer these considerations as suggestions for a preliminary hypothesis, in the hope that they may help to guide and clarify the work of detailed research, and in particular in order to combat the ideas that because Classes are hard to identify Class is non-existent, and that, because the possible bases of classification are numerous, therefore they are infinite and lead into a morass from which no traveller can hope to extricate himself.

THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS¹

By SIR MAURICE AMOS

THE question on which it has been proposed I should offer my modest reflections is that of the future of judicial institutions. I assure you that the rôle of prophet in the sociological field accords little with my philosophic temperament, or rather with my idea of the connection between our knowledge and our ignorance. The causes which determine the evolution of the human family, its emotions and its beliefs, its judgments of value and truth, are so little understood, perhaps so incomprehensible, that it may well appear unpardonable to attempt to predict the future of social institutions, even in a limited sphere. It seems to me to be necessary, in order to speculate usefully on the subject allotted to me, and in order not to lose myself in dreams more appropriate to a novelist than to a jurist, to limit the question at the outset by certain hypotheses.

I am presuming, in the first place, that European civilization is not destined in the near future to break up : that we are not on the verge of an epoch comparable with the centuries between the fifth and tenth of our era. For my part I do not think we are, but since that is logically possible, it is convenient to avoid such a logical disaster by availing ourselves of a hypothesis.

The second hypothesis I find it necessary to make is that Europe, and the other countries of European civilization, will not permit the adoption of a political and social system in which the community is so idealized that the rights and claims of the individual will cease either to enjoy any moral prestige or to expect the utmost protection. In speaking

¹ Translated from a paper given in French at the 1933 International Sociological Congress at Geneva. Sir Maurice Amos is not responsible for the translation.

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of judicial institutions, it must be supposed that respect for the traditional distinction between the acquired rights of individuals and of groups established by private law, on the one hand, and on the other the prerogatives determined essentially by the State, will be upheld. Judicial institutions would be of little interest, and would have small hope of a future, in a society which had lost the taste for open discussion, and which was prepared to recognize in the political and administrative organs of the State the right and the power to subordinate everything to the requirements of the policy of the Government. It was our much-regretted master, Frederick Maitland, who taught that the essential mark of the judicial function consists precisely in this : " To act judicially is to act without a policy." For some types of mind, everything that can offer the least resistance to the administrative policy of the State constitutes an essentially anarchical element, and an obstacle to the realization of the social ideal. My second hypothesis, therefore, supposes that these people will not see the realization of their hopes, at least in some countries, and that judges will continue in the future, as in the past, to assume their function to be the maintenance of a non-*étatiste* conception of the Good.

Having stated these limiting hypotheses, I proceed to the observation that the judicial institutions of the contemporary world divide themselves into two groups or principal types—those of the Anglo-Saxon type and those of the Continental type. To make this distinction clear, we may take English institutions as representative of the one and French institutions of the other ; despite considerable differences of detail, English institutions are reflected, in their broad lines, in all parts of the British Empire and in the United States, whilst the French type is found in almost every other country in the civilized world. The chief distinguishing characteristics of the English system are as follows : properly speaking, the magistracy is not a profession ; the judges, whose number is very limited, are selected at a relatively advanced

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age, from amongst the successful barristers ; once appointed to one set of tribunals they do not expect, or rarely expect, any further advancement ; their salaries are relatively high. So much for the judges of the supreme courts. But a large proportion of the judicial work in the lower courts is done by a non-professional and unpaid magistracy. There are no State attorneys except in Scotland and the United States. In England the functions of the State attorney are exercised by ordinary members of the Bar, who are *ad hoc* representatives of the injured party, of the police, or of any other public body that may be interested. Civil proceedings are complicated and very costly, but it would be a mistake to say that these characteristics are to be explained as survivals of the traditions of the Middle Ages. The ancient traditional practice has been completely overlaid by reforming and rationalizing influences in the course of the nineteenth century, and the elaboration and expense of modern procedure are due exclusively to the desire of our recent legislators to establish a rational system, technically perfect, reducing the risk of surprise to a minimum, and making possible the hearing of argument before the judges in person. English civil procedure is distinguished also by a characteristic which is quite peculiar and from a comparative point of view extremely remarkable. It is essentially inquisitorial, like criminal procedure on the Continent. Each party, plaintiff or defendant, has the right to invoke the sanctions, even the penal sanctions, of the law, to compel his opponent, before the trial, to reveal all the documentary proofs of which he is possessed (even though he may have no intention of using them). Each party has equally the right to demand that his opponent shall answer interrogations on oath. The civil jury, which has left an impression of such fundamental importance upon all departments of Anglo-Saxon law and judicial organization, still retains considerable importance, despite a great decrease in its use. It should also be said that English procedure, with its insistence on rules which have

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the object of making trial by jury possible, attaches a quite special importance to the place of the advocate. This consequently leads to a certain monopolization of litigation, at least in cases of any great importance, by a limited number of barristers, who enjoy a high reputation rather as tacticians than as orators. It is the insistence on the "Day in Court," the decisive occasion when all the evidence is presented in detail, all questions of law fought out in a single hearing (or series of consecutive hearings), which, in order that the jury may do its work, makes a preparatory and eliminating process necessary, and influences the nature of appeals and the rôle of the advocate.

We may add in conclusion that the English system, in principle, does not recognize administrative jurisdiction. By tradition and theory, every controversy susceptible of a judicial solution comes within the competence of the judges of the Common Law, and if, during the last generation, we have seen the creation of a certain number of administrative jurisdictions, this movement has represented a reaction (strongly opposed), caused by socializing tendencies in the modern State, against the traditions, still profoundly rooted, of the individualistic State. These new organs of administrative jurisdiction, aware as one might say of their bastard and questionable birth, are little or badly organized, and offer to those who come under their jurisdiction none of the guarantees of publicity and independence which are found in French administrative jurisdiction.

In summarizing the French judicial system, it would be almost possible simply to take point by point the characteristics of the English system, substituting the black for the white and the white for the black. A large professional magistracy ; a procedure twenty times more simple and ten times less costly ; a complete absence of the civil jury, with all that this implies in subsidiary and correlative institutions ; a relatively smaller degree of importance in the rôle of the advocate ; public prosecution ; extensive

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decentralization of the courts, and highly organized administrative justice.

It is clearly impossible to speak at one and the same time of the future of English or Anglo-Saxon judicial institutions and of French or Continental ; and since, despite a long experience of the administration of justice in its French forms, I am perhaps less incompetent to speak of the probable development of the institutions of my own country, it is in respect of these alone that I shall permit myself to offer some speculations. And in doing so, I shall endeavour to avoid any possible confusion between the reforms of which I should be a partisan, and the development which I think probable or possible in the not too distant future. Let us note, first, that questions of legal reform interest the lay public in England very little. Even the Labour Party has never made proposals in this category figure in its programme. Criticism of our existing institutions comes almost exclusively from members of the legal profession, and of these, almost entirely from the ranks of practising lawyers. Seeing that reformers could not count on much support outside professional circles, and that even there, conservative forces are not lacking in activity, it seems certain that the development will continue to be slow. But it seems equally certain that it will continue. "Slow and sure." The movement for reform in England has never completely stopped, and it would not be too difficult to show that piecemeal improvements in the law, even in matters strictly judicial, have been more numerous and more frequent in England than in France.

I do not think that for some time to come we shall see the establishment of a judicial profession in England. Such a development would be too serious a threat to the prestige of the higher judges to be easily acceptable, and every movement in its support would be weakened by the profound indifference of the English people towards equalitarian conceptions. It may be, however, that on this point the national spirit is destined to undergo a change which I for my part

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should find deplorable ; but the experience of America seems to show that a professional magistracy is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of equalitarian and anti-aristocratic ideals.

On the other hand, I foresee a great reduction in the rôle of the non-professional and unpaid magistrate. There are pros and cons, from the practical as well as from the theoretical standpoint, and time does not permit me to go into the controversy. But I think that in the year 2033 the lay "Justice of the Peace" will be no more than a memory.

Similarly with the civil jury. The public, it is true, has no opinion on its merits or defects ; but the larger part of enlightened opinion at the Bar is clearly hostile to it, and I foresee that before fifty years have passed that opinion will have prevailed. The disappearance of the civil jury will necessarily have the effect of giving a formidable, if not a mortal blow to the institutions and principles which owe their origin and justification precisely to the existence of this organ of lay justice. I refer to the "pleadings"—the preparatory written evidence which plays such a great part to-day in important cases. I refer to the "Law of Evidence"—that body of principles, reasonable enough on the whole, whose purpose is to guard the untrained mind of the jury against vague, sentimental, and superficial evidence, but which would have little importance before a bench composed exclusively of professional judges.

I believe it to be at least possible that England will end by adopting a system of Public Prosecutors, official defenders of the interests of the State, be it in criminal or civil law, as in France, or in penal law as it is found in Scotland and America. It may be, indeed, that we shall follow another American example by instituting as counterpart to the public prosecutor a public defender, responsible for the defence of the poor.

I do not think it is possible to organize a justice equally accessible to the poor and to the rich so long as the profession

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of advocate remains entirely free. And for this reason I think it not impossible that the future will see the completion of an evolution of which the first germs are perhaps already discernible, an evolution in the sense of the socialization of the Bar. I do not think that justice or the litigants would suffer if the right of presenting the case of the litigants were reserved for a special body of State officials. It would perhaps be necessary to assure to them an independence comparable with that of the judges, to enable them to plead freely against the State itself. But allowing for the question of independence, I do not think that the talents which command the large fees, and which, it must be admitted, distinguish the great advocate from the most eminent official, would be the talents essential to the good administration of justice.

Finally, I think we are moving, rapidly enough, towards a frank recognition of the importance of administrative justice, and of the need no longer to look upon it as an unavoidable evil, and towards a reorganization of this justice on foundations capable of assuring its dignity, its independence, and its publicity.

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HANDWÖRTERBUCH DER SOZIOLOGIE. Edited by A. Vierkandt. *Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1931. RM. 69.*

The object of this short cyclopædia of sociology, the editor tells us, is threefold : to make the aims, methods, and achievements of contemporary sociology available to a wider public, to take stock of the present situation in sociology, and to encourage its further development. In this task well nigh all the better-known sociologists in Germany have taken part, and there can be no doubt that the work succeeds in giving an admirable outline of the principal trends of sociological thought in Germany. There are about sixty-two articles of varying length, grouped in the table of contents under the following heads : (i) General, dealing with the history and methods of sociology, the fundamental social relationships and institutions, including social psychology ; (ii) General sociology of culture ; (iii) The sociology of important elements of culture such as technique, religion, law, morals ; and finally (iv) The sociology of certain cultures and epochs, somewhat arbitrarily confined to China; the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the nineteenth century in Europe ; and a short survey of present-day movements in social reform.

No unitary conception of the aims and methods of sociology emerges from these studies. In particular there remains a cleavage between those who are anxious to make sociology into a specialism dealing, as in the case of v. Wiese, with the fundamental social relationships as manifested in outward behaviour, or, as in the case of Vierkandt, with the basic types of the psychical bond, and those who consider that the business of sociology is to give an account of the whole growth and development of societies, and especially of the inter-relations between the various aspects of social life. Nevertheless, deeper examination reveals certain general trends which, remarkably enough, contrast sharply with the mentality of Germany to-day. Of these the most noteworthy is the tendency, abundantly illustrated throughout the work, to get away from the conception of society as a unitary substance and to interpret it rather as a highly complex web or tissue of relationships.

No attempt can here be made to survey the work in detail. It is at its best perhaps in the sections on general sociology. Here we have an illuminating and acute survey of the scope and methods of sociology by Geiger, and lucid and succinct statements of the various schools of thought generally by their leading representatives. The editor himself shows the value, and perhaps the limitations, of the phenomenological method in his study of social psychology, of the types of groups, and of

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morality. V. Wiese gives a very illuminating statement of *Beziehungssoziologie* and defends it against its critics. Toennies gives a fresh rendering of his view of the relation between community and association, and applies it to the study of social classes and of property. Sombart suggests a new classification of social groupings of considerable interest and value. Attention must be drawn to the article on Types and Stages of Culture by Freyer, and especially to that on the Sociology of Culture by Alfred Weber, in which he develops his well-known distinctions between the development of culture, civilization, and society, and brings out the relation between his view of development and that of the materialistic interpretation of history. Of great interest and importance is the article by K. Mannheim on *Wissenssoziologie*, in which he explains the objects and methods of this new branch of sociological inquiry and its relation to the theory of knowledge. On the other hand, the articles dealing with specific elements of culture are somewhat slight, especially those dealing with the family, the state, war, property, and social classes, and the surveys of the sociology of law, of religion, and of art are clearly handicapped by limitations of space.

On the whole this is a useful survey of German sociology before the present régime. What the new sociology will be like it is not yet possible to estimate. As it stands the *Handwörterbuch* will facilitate comparison with inquiries in other countries and help in the work of consolidation so urgently required to-day.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

SACRAMENTS OF SIMPLE FOLK. By R. R. Marett. *Oxford University Press*, 1933. 10s. net.

From a study of the moralization of the sentiments and emotions of religion under the title "Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion," Dr. Marett, in the second course of his Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews (1932-3), proceeds to a consideration of sacramental ritual along the same lines. As in the previous volume, attention is concentrated on "those rudiments of religious faith and observance which are to be imputed to that child of Nature, the so-called savage," as the versatile author has been acquainted with him through the exhaustive study of current anthropological literature, occasional glimpses of him in the flesh, and inferences from "those bones and other relics of his" that he and others have had the good fortune to disinter; on one occasion, be it said (to the certain knowledge of the present reviewer), in peril of his valuable life.

In estimating the validity of primitive magico-religious ritual and belief the same optimistic pragmatic test of the effects and values of

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religion in practice is applied. The essential function of ritual, it is contended, is "to take charge at the point at which the comfortable certainties of the daily round fail us, and action must nevertheless be taken in a spirit of 'never say die.'" The psychological mainspring of this super-rational conviction is "a vital energy which snatches fresh daring out of the very shock of disaster, and, by mobilizing the last reserves of our nature, carries everything before it with an impetus that by ordinary standards seems unaccountable and even more than human." Religion, in short, is a dynamic action, independent of logical thought and of experience, which has enabled man to survive and progress amid all the chances and changes of this mortal life.

In its sacramental aspect it "invests a natural function with a supernatural authority of its own," and thereby consecrates it to a higher purpose in the sacred order. Eating, fighting, mating, educating, ruling, judging, covenanting, healing, dying, are the sacraments of simple folk brought under review in these lectures, and as instruments of religion they are revealed as aids to social life and solidarity in contrast to the mock-ritual of an anti-social magic, "doomed from the first to a hole-and-corner existence." Magic is a travesty of the real thing, "a cheap and degraded imitation of genuine cult" lacking the creativeness of religion, which is "the architectonic force of all social organization."

Out of the sheer desire for food the food-dance develops, and this is found by those concerned to be "good medicine not only for food but for self-realization or spiritual welfare in general." Eating provides food for the soul as well as sustenance for the body. Therefore the food quest assumes a sacramental character in the desire to establish a bond of union with the powers to which the hunter and the agriculturist look for their "daily bread." When, however, the death of the sacred species is involved, the communion becomes an act of atonement in the sense that "a scrupulous eating" constitutes an apology for "a none too scrupulous killing." Moreover, as feelings of pity and gratitude are aroused towards "the kindly beast that dies in order to impart the blessing," and the gulf widens between gift and giver, the way is opened for a rite of thanksgiving to a beneficent Providence.

Sacredness and the sacramental principle are not confined to the food quest. Within the kin, the original home-circle, human life, and human relationships, are sacrosanct, so that murder and incest are abominations, and supernatural sanctions govern marriage, childbearing, education and initiation, the exercise of tribal discipline by ruler or priest-king, the law of contract, and the art of healing, while the last rites are attempts to make the ancestral spirits favourable to the soul of the departed kinsman.

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This in outline is the ground covered by the volume before us, and those who have been looking forward in faith with hopeful anticipation of the completion of Dr. Marett's Gifford Lectures, will certainly not be disappointed or disillusioned by the final achievement. The same sound philosophy that characterized the earlier course is brought to bear upon the anthropological data, past and present, so that specialist and general reader alike will find in these thought-provoking pages mental stimulus and a penetrating analysis of the sacramental ideas of simple folk. This is a book to buy and to read and read again.

E. O. JAMES.

FERTILITY AND REPRODUCTION: The Balance of Births and Deaths. By R. Kuczynski. *Simpkin, Marshall.* 8s. 6d.

Nearly all people cease to believe in the bogey man long before they have passed into adolescence. But the influence of those early terrors may colour their outlook, sympathies and decisions in adult life. Malthus invented a bogey man, and a very convenient bogey man, for the prosperous and eupeptic business men of the two generations which followed him. The study of population statistics in our own time has provided no confirmation for the nightmare of over-population, which Malthus invented and his disciples transmitted. Yet in the depths of the social unconscious the nightmare is still with us. Statisticians like Beveridge and Bowley have diagnosed the disorder. The bulk of educated people resist medical treatment. Perhaps the chief reason why the spectre of over-population continues to haunt us is the clumsiness of our traditional statistical methods. So long as writers on population statistics were content to describe the trends of population growth by drawing up parallel columns of mortality and fertility rates, the Cassandras of the birth-control movement could point to a spectacular diminution in the risk of death to set against a steeply falling birth-rate. Dr. Kuczynski, like Freud, steps in with a new cure. By the introduction of statistical methods which are at once more simple to use or to comprehend and able to epitomize all the fertility and mortality data relevant to a prediction of the future size of a population, he has convinced us that there is no bogey man in the cupboard.

In his two previous studies on population growth in European countries, as in the brief study of American conditions in the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, Kuczynski uses two indices. One, the *gross reproduction rate*, is a measure of fertility alone; the other, the *net reproduction rate*, is a measure of the combined effects of fertility and mortality. To obtain the former the annual fertility rates (births per thousand women of a given age) are added together. The total represents how many children

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1,000 women would have during the whole period of childbearing if the current fertility rates remained constant during that time. If this number is divided by a thousand and multiplied by the proportion of girl children in all births (about 0.48), we know the number of girl children who will be born *on the average* to every mother. This mean figure is the index of fertility which Kuczynski uses. It is far more easy to compute than the various methods of standardizing birth-rates or offspring of completed marriages, and it has a very simple meaning. Unless fertility increases, a population with a gross reproduction rate of less than unity must be extinguished in the long run, however much the mortality rate is reduced. A population cannot continue to increase unless each mother is capable of giving birth to more than one potential mother.

It is equally clear that a population cannot maintain itself unless at least one potential mother born by every living mother survives to become a mother herself. In other words, every newly-born girl must be replaced by at least one girl in the ensuing generation. The mean number of girls who will be born to every newly-born girl if the prevailing fertility rates remain constant during the interval is the *net* reproduction rate. To calculate it, it is only necessary to weight the annual fertility rates by the proportion of survivors in the female life table for each corresponding year of the childbearing period. In other respects the computation is the same as for the gross reproduction rate. This gives us an index in which all the relevant data concerning mortality and fertility are epitomized simultaneously.

Mortality rates standardized by the traditional methods which have been devised to meet the requirements of medical statistics contain much that is irrelevant and may be misleading, because reduction of the deaths which occur after the age of childbearing do not affect the capacity of a population for continued growth. The fertility rates which have been based on the same model leave us with figures that may be useful for comparative purposes but do not directly correspond to the observed data. The new technique combines an elegant simplicity with this advantage. Each index has a definite biological and sociological meaning.

As shown in Kuczynski's earlier studies, in most highly industrialized countries the net reproduction rate is now less than unity, and in a few communities the same can even be said of the gross reproduction rate. The real danger is not over-population, but ultimate extinction. This prompts us to seek a precise connection between a net reproduction rate less than unity and the immediate growth rate of a population. If a population has attained a stable composition in respect to constant

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mortality and fertility rates, it must diminish or increase in each generation in a geometric series, of which the common ratio is the net reproduction rate. On the basis of Dublin and Lotka's researches, Kuczynski devotes much of the present volume to a discussion of how long it takes for a population with a fixed net reproduction rate to attain a fixed age composition. In view of the present capacity for population growth of industrialized countries other than the U.S.S.R. and Japan, it is perhaps reassuring to find that the inertia of population decline is greater than might be expected. Against this consideration we must weigh two facts. The immediate prospects for a significant reduction of mortality in the early years of life are small and the immediate prospect of a continuing decline of fertility are great. Dr. Kuczynski has illustrated the main conclusions of the important researches which Dublin and Lotka have undertaken by simple numerical illustrations presupposing no knowledge of higher mathematics. It is not too much to say that the work of Kuczynski is the most important scientific contribution to the study of population which has yet been made.

LANCELOT HOG BEN.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE : A STUDY OF SUICIDE.

By Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel.

Harrison Smith & Robert Haas, 1933. 433 pages. 17s. 6d.

It is a pity that the authors of this valuable work were not content with their sub-title as sufficient in itself. The catchpenny main title which they have chosen does an injustice to a serious and timely study. To the student of social problems the phenomenon of self-destruction cannot fail to be of lasting importance ; for it is indisputable evidence of fundamental failure to cope with conditions. At the present time the matter has an added interest ; the times are distracted, and we should like to know whether self-destruction is increasing or decreasing.

The book consists of seven parts. The first three are concerned with case studies, the prevalence of suicide and the influence of the environment ; the remainder deal with the history of suicide, life insurance problems, the psychology of suicide and with the prevention of suicide. Finally there are appendices in which the relevant data are most usefully assembled. The special qualifications of the authors, who are statisticians of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and the reputation of the senior author as a social student, encourage high expectations in the field covered by the first three parts, which occupy between a third and a half of the book. And our expectations are not disappointed. Their treatment of the theme is in every way admirable. But the remaining

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parts have not the same originality. They are also necessarily somewhat sketchy, and it is perhaps a question whether the authors would not have been well advised to confine themselves to the province with which they are so thoroughly equipped to deal.

They estimate that the minimum annual number of suicides in the world is 310,000. This is arrived at by supposing that the American suicide rate (15.6 per 100,000), which is about the average for all those countries for which rates can be given, prevails where figures are wanting. Obviously such an estimate is very insecurely founded. But to gauge the extent of suicide we have only to glance at the figures for some of the more important countries which provide them: Irish Free State 3.3, Spain 4.7, Italy 9.6, England and Wales 12.3, U.S.A. 15, France 19.1, Japan 20.6, Switzerland 25.3, Germany 25.9, in each case per 100,000. In addition we have to remember that there are many attempted suicides and many undetected suicides, to say nothing of contemplated suicides. Attempted and undetected suicides together would probably at least equal the number of successful cases that were detected.

There is space here to mention only the more important findings of the authors. Suicide rates fluctuate in all countries; considering together the countries for which figures can be obtained, no general tendency can be found towards the increase or decrease of suicide since 1900, when data first became widely available. The apparent increase of the suicide rate in some countries (e.g. 24.2 per cent. in England and Wales when 1900-14 is compared with 1926-30) is largely accounted for by the fact that male suicide (the incidence of which is everywhere much higher than that of female suicide) increases markedly with age and that the average age of the population has been rising. In the U.S.A., in spite of rising age, the rate has declined by 2.6 per cent. between 1910-14 and 1926-30. In Austria, on the other hand, it rose from 23.3 in 1919 to 39.9 per 100,000 in 1930, the highest suicide rate in Europe. Suicide is markedly low among Catholics. As we have said, suicide is associated with male sex and with advancing age; it is also associated with white as against coloured in the U.S.A., with urban as against rural conditions, with spring and early summer as against the rest of the year, and with business depressions. It is interesting to note, however, that the suicide rate in the U.S.A. has not recently increased in a manner commensurate with the present depression. In addition, it is interesting to note that suicide decreases in wartime (though, generally speaking, soldiers have a relatively high rate) and that suicide has recently increased in an alarming manner among the Jews, who traditionally are little disposed to self-destruction.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS.

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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN YOUNG CHILDREN : A STUDY OF BEGINNINGS. By Susan Isaacs. *George Routledge & Sons*, 1933. 15s.

This sequel to *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* is one which readers of that clear and imaginative analysis have eagerly awaited. Though they may differ from the author in her interpretation, they will not be disappointed, for they will find here the wealth of direct observation and the shrewd constructive criticism that they have learned to expect from Dr. Isaacs.

Much of the present-day writing on child psychology suffers from the limitations either of confusion between observation and interpretation, or a failure to appreciate the need for both. This is particularly true in the subject of social and emotional development, partly because of the relative elusiveness and complexity of the facts themselves, and partly because of the intimate association of these facts with the social and moral values with which personal vested interests are most closely involved.

The book is in no sense a popular exposition. It is addressed to the scientific public, and in particular to those who have a professional interest in psychology and education. There are, however, important inferences to be drawn from the material which have a direct bearing upon the upbringing of young children, upon the prevention of neurosis and delinquency, and upon the wider problems of competition, antagonism, and co-operation which underlie so many social problems.

Most of the facts are drawn again from the detailed records of children's behaviour kept at the Malting House School. These are supplemented by the independent observations of other authors, and by parents' own accounts of their children in written communications. The theoretical discussion, wisely separated from the records, depends more fundamentally upon the author's understanding of psycho-analysis than upon her experience as an educationalist ; but its particular value lies in the fact that she is able to demonstrate how significant the convergence of these two approaches may be.

From the point of view of the sociologist the most interesting records and theories are perhaps those which have bearing upon the genesis of the child's social attitude, and the function of adults and of other children in the growth and stabilization of his social behaviour.

In Dr. Isaacs's view, varieties of social conduct to be found in young children—the change from ego-centrism to co-operation ; the fluctuating individual and group loyalties ; the direct physical and verbal expression on the one hand of hostility and aggression, on the other of solicitude and

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affection—cannot be explained by the postulation of any such simple theory as the development of the social instinct or the “conditioning” of group experience. Fundamentally, the child’s sense of what is good and bad, as well as his ability to share his interests and his allegiance, depends upon his capacity to solve his own psychic tensions, and can only be understood by means of qualitative analysis which seeks to explain the origin of anxiety and guilt. This depends primarily upon the psychic need for love and assurance which is the complement of hunger. The inevitable experience of deprivation in infancy does not merely *produce* hostility, but is, in the child’s primitive mind, *identified* with it. Thus the ambivalent attitude of love and hate towards the parents and towards rivals for the parents’ love is the prototype of the child’s future relationships. Faced with intolerable conflict between his own love and hostility, the child may unconsciously insure his own safety by incorporating the harsh world of authority and becoming his own castigator; or he may reach a working compromise by finding outlet both for his affection and aggression in the more neutral relationships outside the family, where direct expression does not threaten his own specific source of safety.

According to this view we need not seek for the causes of neurosis or the failure of normal adaptation in terms of the child’s “real” experience, though this may be of great significance either in the confirmation or the modification of his phantasy. The sources of conflict are inherent in the mental life of the child himself, and in the prolonged situation of dependency characteristic of the human species. Successful social adaptation will depend partly upon differences of temperament, but mainly upon the degree to which experience both within and outside the home can establish a satisfactory synthesis between the child’s personal need for response and assurance and his necessary acceptance of the limitations imposed by the physical and social world.

The educational implications of this theory are obviously far-reaching, and it is here that Dr. Isaacs’s experience, both as teacher and therapist, is of particular value. The separation of these two approaches has often led, on the one hand, to an educational practice based upon a crude appreciation of the dangers of suppression and the value of freedom; on the other, to a system of discipline and organized learning which has little reference to the nature of emotional and intellectual growth. The fact that the child meets the adult with the attitudes and tensions which are the product of his phantasies and of his family experiences does not justify her withdrawal from the responsibility of authority and direction, though it must determine the form that this will take. It is her function to recognize and accept the duality of the child’s early emotional responses and to help him to reconciliation by understanding combined

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with authority. To allow the child to give free expression to hostility, or to leave him to learn without guidance the competitive demands of others, is to confirm, and not to resolve, his inner conflicts.

"What the child actually needs is that the parents and adults who make up his social world should represent to him a stable and ordered world of values, values closely related to the child's real abilities at any given age, and based upon an understanding of his psychological needs, but which are, nevertheless, firm and unwavering in themselves. . . . If . . . real external control is firm and secure, but mild and tempered, it enables the child to master his destructive impulses and to learn to order and adapt his wishes to the real world."

It is then incompatible with the function of the educator as a tranquillizing influence in the child's emotional development to seek to investigate the underlying causes of his anxiety, and in this Dr. Isaacs shows divergence from many of the German and Austrian analysts and some experimental educationalists. Psycho-analysis, in her view, can only be carried out where the child is protected from the dangers of doing real damage in the world to which he must adjust, but the therapist must in the nature of her task tolerate the full expression of ambivalent attitudes. For the adult to attempt to combine the rôles of educationalist and therapist is to defeat the true purposes of both functions.

In her study of the child's intellectual growth, Dr. Isaacs demonstrated the importance of social experience in cognitive development. Here the emotional significance of group activity is developed. Individual and group hostility cannot be explained on any simple theory of self-assertion or pugnacity. It is often the converse side of the child's need for reassurance, and the first experience of shared interests and attitudes may actually depend upon the opportunity it gives for the displacement and projection of hostility upon the "outsider." It is the possibility of satisfying intellectual and social activities which, with the steadying influence of adult justice, gradually builds the bridge between egocentric isolation in action and feeling and "the warm sense of togetherness" which makes for stable social relationships.

On the general theory of the close association between the child's early emotional development in his family setting and his social attitude we have ample confirmation from those who would not accept as a whole either the pattern of inherent childish beliefs in regard to parental relationships, or the mechanisms by which, in the psycho-analytic view, those beliefs become modified. We are still waiting for a methodological critique, which, while accepting the data of child analysts, and making due allowance for the subjective conditions of discovery, will scrutinize both the facts and the hypotheses in the light of other findings and

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theories, and will weigh their value from the standpoint of evidence and of the adequacy and economy of explanation. In the meantime all those who are concerned either with normal children or with those who present special difficulties should welcome without theoretical pre-judgment such original and penetrating studies as Dr. Isaacs has given us in the first two volumes of her series on the development of young children.

S. CLEMENT BROWN.

JUVENILE UNEMPLOYMENT. By J. Jewkes and Allan Winterbottom.
Allen and Unwin. 5s.

The authors of the above-named book have clearly been much moved by the result of their investigations into the plight of the rising generation in Lancashire and Cumberland, and they show that the ancient evils of blind-alley and casual employment of school-leavers, followed by chronic unemployment during adolescence, have reached such a pass in the north-western area that remedial action of some kind is imperative. And what is true of the cotton area is true also of other large communities in Scotland, Wales and the north-eastern area. Nor, in principle, is the result much better in areas like London, where a rapid succession of small jobs is the normal experience of a vast host of juveniles.

Failure to find any worthy occupation or interest in life is one of the most soul-destroying influences to which the young can be subjected ; it is bound to lead to a lowering of their quality, both as citizens and as workers, when they grow up. Yet the task of combating the spread of these anti-social conditions is not insuperable ; it is no mystery. Only the will to action and the money are lacking. There are obvious ways in which we could ensure to all boys and girls continuous and regulated occupation from the year of their release from school up to 18. In the first place, we can do a good deal more for the unemployed. Under the terms of the new Unemployment Bill we can, in 1934, develop a genuine system of schooling for the disengaged between 14 and 18. In place of our rather makeshift Junior Instruction Centres, attended for only fifteen hours a week by one in every seven registered juveniles, we can provide for full-time attendance at approved courses, at least in all the urban areas. This, however, is, at best, a topsy-turvy solution ; it puts the educational emphasis in the wrong place. Instead of conferring the privilege of continued instruction on the exceptional boy (i.e. the unemployed), while the normal boy is cast free from all schooling, it would be more rational to make education beyond 14 the normal condition, while permits for employment could be given to the exceptional lad in whose case good personal reasons (and a decent job) are

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forthcoming. This would be to raise the school age to 15 along the lines of least resistance, and it might be done, as Lord Eustace Percy suggests, by stages of a term at a time. Full schooling to 15 is, of course, a recognized educational objective. The Hadow Scheme demands it, even without the pressing argument of social need in places such as Lancashire. And already this forward step has been taken under by-laws by the local education authorities of Plymouth, Chesterfield, East Suffolk and one or two other areas.

But there is a school of thought which pleads for an alternative option for education authorities, namely, the requirements of half-time continued education for two or more years after 14 instead of full time for one year only. And, indeed, the latter plan might prove the better of the two in the long run. For one thing, it would be more flexible and thus more acceptable to industry. What we have to do is not merely to solve the old perplexities, both human and economic, which surround the transition from school to industry, but also to set about the adjustment of our minds and habits to the *new* distribution of labour and leisure throughout the community. And Continental practice certainly seems to strengthen the case for combining learning with earning during the years of adolescence.

Last but not least is the argument that the further we raise the age for part- or full-time instruction, the more we shall decrease unemployment at the dangerous age of 16 to 18, and, indeed, increase the demand for workers of all adult ages. In the result there would be a noticeable saving on unemployment benefit and relief to set off against the cost of the system of extended education and of allowances, when they prove necessary.

The latter reflections are a reminder that the problems of juvenile and adult unemployment are too often considered apart. Yet they are both symptoms of the same disorder in the labour market, and, on the industrial side, are both susceptible to the same treatment, namely, the building up of an Employment Policy on lines that will afford greater security for the required personnel together with some control over the incidence of enforced leisure. No industry needs this more than the Cotton Trade, which has occupied so much of the thought of the authors of the book under review. Yet they do not show any particular interest either in the "Cotton" employment question as a whole, or in the question of dispersing the surplus labour force, which is still clinging desperately and pathetically to its home area—simply because it is "home." There is surely a big problem in this for our educationists and our national administrators. Are they to create expanded educational equipment for the new line of advance in areas like Lancashire, where there is a

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large prospective surplus of work-people, and where the best hope for that redundant army is to move out to new areas and new occupations?

It is, however, inappropriate to close this review with a question which obstructs or is at least unhelpful to so many of the reforms that Mr. Jewkes and Mr. Winterbottom stand for. They have written a forceful and timely plea for immediate measures of juvenile salvage, and we hope their words will be listened to.

R. C. DAVISON.

CO-OPERATION AND CHARLES GIDE. Edited by Karl Walter of the Horace Plunkett Foundation. 175 pp. P. S. King, 1933. 8s. 6d.

This book itself is a happy piece of co-operation. The editor, like the reviewer, is a member of the International Institute for the Study of Co-operation, which appears on the title page. It was founded by Gide shortly before his death. It held its second meeting at Paris in 1932; and the papers read there form the second half of the book. The first half consists of appreciations of Gide by Mr. Walter and Gide's colleagues.

Thus Professor Oualid of the Faculty of Law, Paris, writes of *Gide, Economist and Sociologist*; Professor Lavergne of the Faculty of Law, Lille, of *Gide, Founder of the Doctrine of Consumers' Co-operation*; Mr. Louis Tardy of the Caisse nationale de crédit agricole of *Gide and Agricultural Co-operation*. Gide's collaborator in the *History of Economy Doctrines*, Charles Rist, permits the translation of the appreciation which he wrote for the *Revue d'économie politique* founded by Gide himself, and Mr. A. Daudé-Bancel adds personal memories.

The Institute papers cover a wide range: E. Grünfeld (Halle), *The Universities' Services to Co-operation*; K. Ihrig (Budapest), *Relation between Agricultural and Consumers' Co-operative Societies*; N. Barou, *Co-operative Finance in Capitalist Economy*; C. F. Strickland (I.C.S.), *Co-operative Methods in Tropical Countries*. Thus at Paris the voice of many nations was heard. It is the purpose of the Institute to bring together teachers of co-operation rather than the officers in the movement. Charles Gide (1847-1931) was professor of political economy at Montpellier in the south of France before he went to the University of Paris, and after the war he held a chair at the *Collège de France* endowed by French co-operators. Therefore the whole book is a picture of co-operation on its academic side. It is through such avenues—the study of men like Gide and the exchange of academic opinion which his Institute promotes—that we may hope to arrive eventually at something like a general philosophy of the co-operative movement. It is high time to remove the partition which exists in the mind of the English public between Gide the economist and Gide the co-operator. His economics, the *Principles* of 1883, the Political

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Economy of 1909 (*Cours d'économie politique*, "the presentation in a new garb of an old familiar friend"—L. L. Price, *Economic Journal* 1909, vol. XIX, p. 417) and the *History of Economic Doctrines* (with Rist) of 1909 are known to the young economists of many lands. As Professor Chapman, reviewing the English translation (1914) of the *Cours*, observes: "It omits much that the dominant English School would deem of fundamental scientific importance . . . On price determination, international trade, wages and so forth, we find our author coming to a stop just where the English . . . would begin" (*Economic Journal*, 1915, vol. XXV, p. 70). Gide must be read (says the reviewer) for his humanism. We need both Gide and Marshall.

But Marshall's *Principles* too, when they first appeared, were hailed for their humanism; and there is nothing in Gide's formal economics to place him among the immortals. He fought a fair and long-enduring battle with the old school of liberal political economy and saw his views prevail. He was a gentle critic and a good scholar. But in addition there was the other Gide, known only in intimate form (outside France, of course) to the comparatively few serious students of the co-operative movement. Even in France he brought co-operation in by the back door. He was, as happens there, a journalist as well as a professor; and his co-operative medium was the magazine *L'émancipation*, which he managed to the time of his death. It was published at Nîmes, which is not far from Montpellier: hence the title of the co-operative followers of Gide, the School of Nîmes. A charming Frenchman, Gide was a passionate internationalist also, and he played an intimate part in the formation and development of the International Co-operative Alliance, which to-day has its secretarial headquarters in London next door to the premises of the publishers of this book. I shall never forget travelling in his company to the Cremona Congress in September 1907. I felt myself talking to the grandson of Robert Owen or the son of Vansittart Neale.

It is a strange coincidence that within a fortnight of each other the two great philosophers of co-operation in our generation died—Gide March 14, Sir Horace Plunkett March 26, 1931. It is curious too that the strength of French co-operation is in agriculture, for which Sir Horace wrote the philosophy, while the strength of British co-operation is in the consumers' movement, for which Gide rendered a corresponding service. Both of them had moods in which they felt that their life work had all but failed. Plunkett turned from Ireland to the overseas Empire, only to find them heading for compulsory co-operation, the negation of his life-long creed. Gide could not see any working solidarity in the French "syndicat agricole," the parent stem of agricultural co-operation in the Latin countries. "It may be that because of her prosperity 'la belle France'

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has allowed herself to be outdistanced on the path of agricultural co-operation," he wrote as late as 1930 in the Year Book of the Plunkett Foundation, and he was far too fair a scholar to close his eyes to the fact that consumers' co-operation in France was only an island in her economic life.

There is, perhaps, in this dual picture a profound lesson for sociology. Philosophy seems to find itself when it is confronted with failure. Is it that success materializes the mind, so that it can think no more of values? Is it that all but failure brings vision beyond the ordinary? Is it that as we get things right they are so right that we have no longer anything inspiring to say about them? I think not. I think it is chiefly because, as yet, in our sociology we talk the things that are subordinate to it—jargon, anthropology, demography, and the like. We do not think through the spiritual movements around us into the ultimate social realities.

C. R. FAY.

THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT. By David Mitrany. *Allen & Unwin, 1933. 5s.*

In this short book, comprising four lectures given at Yale University, Dr. Mitrany renders an excellent service to the cause of internationalism. His learning and great skill in exposition give the most lucid account of the emergence of this great idea and its gradual embodiment in fact that has yet appeared.

In his opening chapter, Dr. Mitrany describes the unity of Europe in its pre-nationalist era, first under the Roman political sway and afterwards under the Holy Roman Empire, then the break-away into the era of State individualism by way of the Reformation and the Renaissance. From that time on to the close of the eighteenth century, the whole trend of events was towards the establishment of absolute sovereignty backed by divine right for the rulers of national states. The State, as expounded so successfully by Machiavelli, stood "above ordinary morality" and was, in fact, founded upon its own interpretation of its rights, i.e. on force. Early international jurists, such as Grotius, though providing an ethical and philosophical basis for an international order, had little influence upon the actual course of events. For nations were far more concerned with their internal order and strength than with their relations to one another. "Natural law," while it evoked a recognition of the equality of States, did not envisage the growth of fraternity through organized co-operation. For such co-operation, to be effective, would involve some definite cession of sovereignty, a condition which, as we see, many of the Powers are still reluctant to contemplate. The high international

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ideals and maxims flaunted by the French Revolution speedily dissolved into struggles for national freedom and democracy. The Concert of Europe and the Congresses summoned during the nineteenth century were confined to the settlement of specific disputes and there was no serious attempt to set up any continuous collective authority. It was the age of the rise and expansion of Great Powers, with the acquiescence of smaller nations satisfied with independence.

The problem as Dr. Mitrany presents it, is "how to translate in international affairs the principle of equality from a barren dogma into a working system" (p. 62); "Legal, political, and social equality in their varying connotations, are the three postulates for the government of any society built upon reason and goodwill" (p. 63). Until quite recently it was believed that the acceptance of democracy with some economic applications, was in process of realizing these postulates within each civilized nation. Internationalism, then, seemed to imply the extension of accepted principles to the wider sphere of a society of nations. This process has, however, been rendered far more difficult by the temporary victory of "force" over reason and goodwill within so many national states. During the past century, however, it has been manifest that the greatest unifying influence in the world has been the economic interdependence and intercourse of its members. That influence was working in the establishment of numerous international bodies, partly political, partly economic or cultural, for the achievement of common purposes of welfare. Commerce and finance were the backbone of this internationalism, and seemed bound to bring both nations and their governments into ever closer union for the better development and enjoyment of the resources of the earth.

The present plunge of so many nations into an attempted economic self-sufficiency or isolation cannot be regarded as more than a temporary set-back to the cause of economic internationalism. Its failure, indeed, is already woefully apparent. Now, economic internationalism must more and more bring "the communal organization of world affairs." In spite of its defects of structure and operation, the League of Nations must be taken as the nucleus of such an international organization, and Dr. Mitrany in his later chapters makes exceedingly profitable suggestions towards the reform of that organization. In particular, he stresses the importance of a functional development as distinguished from a local-political. Such success as has been attained by the League has been due largely to the application of the principle to such matters as the opium and white slave trades and to commercial codes. "A functional integration of technical services upon the largest possible international scale would seem to be as indispensable, as a more liberal devolution of cultural

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activities, which should free the individual genius of each regional or national group, would seem to be desirable as a more rational approach to the ideal ends of political society " (p. 102). In a word, not so much " areas " as " segments " of government are to be desiderated. Such a movement would get rid of much of the inflamed nationalism which is the chief impediment to world progress.

In a final chapter on " Authority in the world of States " the author confronts the current issues which divide opinions alike among pacific internationalists and blatant nationalists, viz. the existence and nature of sanctions behind international law or treaty. Dr. Mitrany rightly recognizes that effective law demands effective sanctions, and that such sanctions require the acceptance and utilization of physical force in the last resort. The notion that reason and goodwill can suffice to maintain justice and peace in our world by their moral appeal alone, is simply to ignore certain permanent factors in the human make-up. From no realm of human conduct can force be completely eliminated as a necessary factor. But as Dr. Mitrany points out, a police force under accepted authority, is a different thing from force wielded by individual or national self-assertion. He confronts the issues of the right of self-defence against aggression and the right of neutrality. In the former case he fails, however, to deal with the real issue where one nation may suddenly invade another before there is time to make " police " authority effective. Within a national society the right of forcible self-defence here survives. Can it be eliminated from the Society of Nations ?

J. A. HOBSON.

WOMEN IN SUBJECTION. By I. B. O'Malley. *Duckworth*. 15s.

It is the fashion nowadays for young people of both sexes to assert that they are not feminists, and to cherish the opinion that the whole women's movement is out of date. This, of course, is one of the natural consequences of the rapid success of the movement, and means only that they have so fully accepted its principles that they take them for granted. It has, however, the curious result that the extraordinary social change which has taken place in the last hundred years is almost unknown to the present generation, who are better informed as to the lives of pre-historic men than as to those of their own great-grandparents.

By this attitude the young people of to-day no doubt save themselves much tiresome controversy ; but they also miss the significance of many of the modern developments of society, and they certainly ignore what is a fascinating field of historical research, packed with " human interest," and dramatic events.

" Women in Subjection," which has as its sub-title " A Study of the

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Lives of Englishwomen before 1832," gives us the full flavour of all that old drama and passion, and gives it, too, in a shape from which the general outlines as well as the detailed incidents can be distinguished. We see the difficulties of women's lives against the pattern of the society in which they lived, and we see their strength and their weakness, their agonies and compensations through scores of individual examples. The whole scene is welded together so as to show how social convention and legal disability actually worked out in life, and we see the effects of the theory of subjection upon wives, mothers, workers, young ladies and women of talent and ambition, not in the general terms of a theorist, but in the actual vivid research of a historian.

No one who wants to understand what life was really like in the eighteenth-century England can afford to miss this book. It adds to our knowledge something which has been too often ignored in the writing of history, namely, the women's side ; and it does it with an insight, an accuracy and a charm which should commend it also to the casual reader who only wants to pass a pleasant hour. Such a one, indeed, may find that new trains of thought, and slightly disturbing reflections, remain in his mind to affect his view of modern life. But everyone of sense likes to have new ideas agreeably and gently presented to him ; and for this purpose the book can be confidently recommended.

R. STRACHEY.

THE WORKERS' POINT OF VIEW. A Symposium. *Hogarth Press.* 4s. 6d. net.

In this little book six articles of unequal length, but all of considerable interest, are reprinted from the journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. A certain piquancy derives from the fact that the fruits of actual experience are placed on record and not mere academic assumptions—the "points of view" including those of a working mechanic, a miner, a plasterer and a compositor, all of whom are unanimous in emphasizing the need for more consideration of the human factor in the field of industry. The miner's contribution, which takes up about a third of the whole book, is perhaps particularly interesting, in view of the urgency of the situation it illuminates ; in the past, the loss from strikes and lock-outs in the coal industry has been comparatively insignificant compared with that due to lack of co-operation between employer and employee, and the writer lays bare some of the roots from which misunderstanding has sprung. The type of analysis undertaken in this and the other papers—often acute and always suggestive, may be commended to the attention of all who are concerned to improve the spirit, and with it the efficiency, of organized industry at the present time.

E. I. BLACK.

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 Saudek (Robert). ANONYMOUS LETTERS. Methuen. 5s.
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ASIATIC REVIEW	Oct.
BILDSTATISTIK	Vol. II., No. 12
BRITISH JOURNAL OF EDUCATION PSYCHOLOGY	Nov.
BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE	Sept.
CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY	Sept.
CHARITY ORGANIZATION QUARTERLY	Oct.
COUNCIL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF RURAL ENGLAND	Oct.
ECONOMIC JOURNAL	Sept.
ECONOMICA	Aug.
EUGENICS REVIEW	Oct.
GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW	Oct.
GEOGRAPHY	Sept.
HEADWAY	Sept., Oct., Nov.
HIGHWAY	Oct., Nov.
HINDUSTAN REVIEW	July

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

INDIAN MAGAZINE	Aug., Oct.
INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION ORGANIZATION	Vol. I., Nos. 9-10, 11-12
INFORMATION BULLETIN—REGIONAL PLAN	Aug.
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION	Sept., Oct., Nov., Dec.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	Sept., Oct., Nov.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE	Aug., Sept., Oct.
ISLAMIC REVIEW	Sept., Oct., Nov.
JOURNAL OF ADULT EDUCATION	Oct.
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY	July, Aug., Sept.
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY	Oct.
JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS AND OPEN SPACES	Oct.
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY	Oct.
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL PLAYING FIELDS	Oct.
JOURNAL OF THE OSAKA UNIVERSITY OF COMMERCE	Nov.
JOURNAL OF TRANSACTIONS	Jan.
KENT EDUCATION GAZETTE	Sept., Oct., Nov.
KÖLNER VIERTELJAHRSSHEPTE	1933, Pt. II
KYOTO UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC REVIEW	July
LECTURE RECORDER	Oct., Nov.
MAN	Sept., Oct., Nov., Dec.
MILLGATE MONTHLY	Oct., Nov., Dec.
MUSÉE SOCIAL	Sept., Oct.
NEWS LETTER	Oct.
NOW AND THEN	No. 46
NUOVI STUDI	May
ØKONOMI OG POLITIK	Vol. VII, Nos. 2, 3
ORGANIZED HELP	Oct.
PLUS LOIN	Sept., Oct., Nov.
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY	Sept.
PROGRESS	Sept.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	Nov.
REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE	Sept.
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RIVISTA DI PSICOLOGIA E PEDAGOGIA	Vol. I, No. 1
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ROTARY WHEEL	Oct., Nov., Dec.
SBORNIK	Vol. VIII, No. 4
SCIENTIA	Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov.
SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE	Sept., Nov.
SEARCH	Oct.
SERVICE	Vol. II, No. 8
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEWS	Sept., Nov.
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SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH	Sept., Oct.
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SOZIAL-UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	Vol. XXVI, No. 2
VESTNIK (ZEMEDEL'SKEHO MUSEA)	Vol. VI, Pt. 3
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